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the occasion of the bi-centennial ....
Well over three
hundred billion dollars a year go into its maintenance; it
is deployed in several dozen countries around the world.
The returned Framers would not be surprised to learn
that so vast a military has inexorable effects upon the
economy, the structure of government, and even the culture of Americans; they had witnessed such effects in
Europe from afar, and had not liked what they saw.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

N 1958, Sergeant James B. Stanley volunteered for an Army
program he had been told was designed to test protective
clothing and equipment.2 Instead, he was given lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD) without his knowledge or consent. This
made him one of many unknowing guinea pigs in a series of top
secret chemical warfare experiments intended to study the effects
of LSD on human beings. 3 Many years later, when Stanley discovered what had occurred, 4 he sued the Army for damages,5
claiming a violation of his constitutional right to due process of
1. R. NISBET, THE PRESENT AGE: PROGRESS AND ANARCHY IN MODERN
AMERICA 1 (1988).
2. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987).
3. See id. A 1976 Senate Report indicates that in the 1950s military intelligence agencies and the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a surreptitious
program of testing chemical and biological materials, including LSD, on human
subjects in order "to determine the potential effects of chemical or biological
agents when used operationally against individuals unaware that they had received a drug." S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Book I, at 385 (1976).
Stanley's lawsuit was not the only one to result from this series of clandestine
chemical and biological warfare experiments. See also Nevin v. United States,
696 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.) (wrongful death action for death allegedly resulting
from simulated biological warfare attack on San Francisco), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
815 (1983); Sweet v. United States, 687 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1982) (tort action
seeking damages for alleged after-effects of LSD experiments); Barrett v. United
States, 660 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (wrongful death action on behalf of
mental hospital patient used as unknowing subject in Army-sponsored test of
mescaline derivative); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va.
1980) (suit concerning injuries from non-consensual exposure to mustard gas
during secret experiments in 1944); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp.
344 (D.D.C. 1979) (suit by soldier unknowingly drugged in tests of LSD).
4. Stanley became aware of his unwitting participation in these experiments
in 1975, when the Army sent him a letter soliciting his participation "in a study
of the long-term effects of LSD on 'volunteers who participated' in the 1958
tests." Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671.
5. Stanley claimed he had suffered hallucinations, episodes of violent behavior, incoherence and memory loss as a result of his unknowing exposure to
LSD. Id. These effects led to his discharge from the Army and the break-up of
his marriage. Id.
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Ultimately, Stanley's claim reached the United States
Supreme Court. His claim presented the Justices with a difficult
dilemma. On the one hand, the Army had apparently violated
Stanley's constitutional rights in a particularly disturbing manner. 7 On the other hand, the violation had occurred as part of
Stanley's military service while he was a soldier. Permitting Stanley's claim to go forward could open a Pandora's box of other
possible claims against the military. Such claims might interfere
with the military's efficient exercise of its job of protecting national security.
The Supreme Court Justices had faced a similar dilemma in a
series of earlier cases in which other members of the armed forces
raised claims against the military for violations of their constitutional rights. 8 In each of these cases, as in Stanley, a slim majority
of the Court decided-over vigorous dissent-that the claims
must be denied. In denying each of these claims, the majority
articulated a special standard of judicial review for constitutional
6. Stanley's complaint included claims under both the United States Constitution and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA is the legal mechanism for compensating persons injured by negligent or wrongful acts of federal
employees committed within the scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (1988). The FTCA claims were dismissed by the district court.
See United States v. Stanley, 549 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D. Fla. 1982). These
FTCA claims were subsequently held to be potentially viable by the court of
appeals. See United States v. Stanley, 786 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11 th Cir. 1986). The
Supreme Court, however, vacated the portion of the court of appeals' decision
which allowed Stanley to replead his FTCA claims. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 678. The
main issue before the Court in Stanley was the viability of his constitutional
claims. Id. at 676.
7. These violations were outlined by the district court:
This court views the conduct alleged in the Amended Complaint as
an egregious intrusion on the most precious right protected by the
Constitution-the right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. The surreptitious administration of LSD to
an unwitting serviceman ...constitutes a violation of the rights of privacy and bodily integrity, and of the right of an individual to control his
mind, his private thoughts and his intellectual process.
Stanley, 549 F. Supp. at 331. Involuntary experimentation on human beings is
also a violation of a central precept of the Nuremberg Code, which mandates
that "[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." Military Tribunal No. I; Case 1; United States v. Brandt ("the Medical Case"), 2 TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10 181 (1949).

8. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (first amendment does
not require military to accommodate religious practices); Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57 (1981) (gender discrimination claim); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980) (freedom of speech claim); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (vagueness and overbreadth challenges under first amendment). For a discussion of
these cases, see infra notes 10-42 and accompanying text.
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claims against the military. This standard was highly deferential
to the military, much more deferential than the standard that the
court would apply in evaluating similar claims against civilian institutions. In response, the often-outraged dissenters objected
that the majority was abdicating its judicial duty to protect the Bill
of Rights. 9
Part II of this article examines this line of cases, which I will
call "the Stanley cases," tracing the positions of both the majority
and the dissent. It demonstrates that the seemingly irreconcilable
difference between the two sides is a reflection of the tension inherent in the dilemma of reconciling our constitutional aspirations toward civil liberty with the demands of military need.
Although both sides recognize this conflict, neither fully appreciates or wrestles with it. Instead, both majority and dissent seek a
too-easy resolution of the tension: the majority in favor of military institutions by commanding judicial deference to the military;
the dissent in favor of individual liberty by ignoring military reality. Both approaches are ultimately unsatisfactory because both
attempt to sidestep the tension between military institutions and
civil liberties rather than face it directly.
The Court appears to have forgotten that this very tension
was the subject of intense and passionate debate during the nation's founding days. In Part III, I review this debate which is
known as the "standing army" controversy. As Part III describes,
the American revolutionary generation strongly distrusted professional military institutions as dangerous to liberty. Indeed,
during the drafting of the Constitution in Philadelphia, and in the
ensuing ratification debates, the new Constitution was opposed in
part because of the fear that it would permit large national peacetime military forces to develop. A desire to limit this possibility
was one important, if often overlooked, motivation behind the demand for a Bill of Rights.
This too-often neglected slice of constitutional history is important for its own sake. In addition, as I suggest in Part IV, this
historical perspective can help us to rethink the nature of the dilemma presented by the Stanley cases. In the eighteenth century,
debate about the conflict between civil liberties and military
institutions focused on the proper structural place of those institutions in the developing life of the new nation. Without recon9. See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan, consistent dissenter in these cases, labels majority's approach the "subrational-basis standard").
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sideration of this broader question, contemporary attempts to
reconcile the continuing tension between military institutions and
claims of individual liberty are doomed to fail.

II.

ARTICULATING A STANDARD OF DEFERENCE:
THE STANLEY CASES

Although the Supreme Court has adjudicated constitutional
issues arising in connection with our military forces since the earliest days of the nation,' 0 it is only relatively recently that the
Court has faced a series of claims by individual members of the
armed services alleging that the military had infringed upon their
constitutional rights. The recent appearance of these cases is a
result both of the enormous growth of the national military establishment since the end of World War II and the new political understanding of the possibilities for individual rights within the
military which grew out of Nuremberg and the G.I. protest movements of the Vietnam War era. The development and expansion
of constitutional civil rights doctrine in civilian contexts by the
Warren Court provided the legal matrix within which civil rights
claims against the military could be framed.
In seeking protection for their rights of free speech, gender
equality, 12 religious freedom,' 3 and due process, 14 members of
the military have asked the Court to apply to military institutions
complex bodies of civil rights law developed in civilian contexts.
Given the intricacy of these civil rights doctrines, and the complicated nature of the factual settings, these would be difficult decisions under any circumstances. But what is striking about the
majority's approach in the Stanley line of cases is that it decided
not to apply the legal standards and tests developed in civilian
contexts to the different factual setting of military life. Instead,
the majority articulated a separate, and highly deferential, standard of judicial review.
The majority first suggested an especially deferential standard of review for constitutional claims against the military dur10. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (challenge to
validity of President Lincoln's blockade of Southern ports); Dynes v. Hoover, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858) (challenge to jurisdiction of Navy court-martial); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (challenge to validity of call-up of
militia member during War of 1812),
11. See Brown, 444 U.S. 348; Parker, 417 U.S. 733.
12. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
13. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
14. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Parker, 417 U.S. 733.
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ing the Vietnam War era. In Parker v. Levy, 15 Army Captain
Howard Levy challenged his court-martial convictions for violations of Articles 133 ("conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman") and 134 ("disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces") of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.' 6 Levy was Chief of Dermatology at a
United States Army Hospital in South Carolina during the Vietnam War. When Levy was ordered to train Special Forces aide
men, he refused on the basis that his medical ethics prohibited
such a practice. He also made a series of public statements to
enlisted men at the base, expressing his strong opposition to the
war and his opinion that he and others should refuse to obey or17
ders to go to Vietnam.
Levy challenged his convictions under Articles 133 and 134
on the grounds that these articles were both void for vagueness
and overbroad in violation of the first amendment. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "as measured by contemporary standards of vagueness applicable to statutes and ordinances governing civilians," Articles 133 and 134
"do not pass constitutional muster."1 8 Reversing the decision of
the court of appeals, the five-Justice majority opinion written by
Justice Rehnquist articulated and emphasized a conception of the
military as "a specialized society separate from civilian society," 1 9
subject to different norms and freer of the constitutional constraints which apply to civilian life.
In Parker, the majority returned again and again to the theme
that military life calls for a different standard of constitutional
review than civilian life.2 0 Even so, it appears the majority may
15. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
16. Id. at 740. The Uniform Code of Military justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§§ 801-940 (1988), was enacted by Congress in 1951. The purpose of the
UCMJ is to enforce a "reorientation of the person" by specifying "controls on
the behavior of servicemen and penalties to be levied for violations of its provisions." S. ULMER, MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4 (1970).
17. Parker, 417 U.S. at 735-37.
18. Id. at 741 (quoting Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d at 793 (3d Cir. 1973)).
19. Id. at 743.
20. See, e.g., id. at 742 (noting that even court of appeals acknowledged that
in some circumstances "different standards might.., be applicable in considering vagueness challenges to provisions which govern the conduct of members of
the Armed Forces"); id. at 744 (citations to various authorities suggesting military society is "a society apart from civilian society"); id. at 756 (Congress has
more latitude in legislating for military than for civilian society); id. at 758 (first
amendment to be applied differently to military than to civilian life); id. at 760
(same).
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have been uncomfortable resting its decision solely on the foundation of a separate legal standard for the military. This discomfort is suggested by the fact that although the Justices in the
majority articulated a separate standard of review, they also
sought to demonstrate that Levy's conviction under Articles 133
and 134 would be acceptable even under ordinary principles of
vagueness and overbreadth. The majority opinion asserted that
even if on their face the phrases "conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman" and "disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline" appear unconstitutionally vague, they
were rendered valid by the specificity supplied by military usage,
narrowing decisions by the United States Court of Military Appeals, and illustrative examples in the Manual for Courts-Martial. 2 1 Furthermore, the opinion stated that the conduct for which
Levy was convicted- "that of a commissioned officer publicly
urging enlisted personnel to refuse to obey orders which might
send them into combat"-is "unprotected under the most expan22
sive notions of the First Amendment."
The dissent was dismayed by the articulation of a separate
standard of constitutional review for the military. 2 3 It also rejected the majority's conclusion that Levy's conviction would be
constitutional under generally accepted standards of constitutional jurisprudence. The dissenters did not agree that the facial
vagueness of the articles was cured by narrowing military constructions, 24 or that Levy's conduct was indisputably beyond the
protection of the first amendment. 2 5 These disputes, in turn, reflect differing views about the nature of military institutions.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, recognized this
"crucial difference" 2 6 between the perceptions of the majority
and the dissent. He pointed out that the dissent was worried by
the possibility of arbitrary enforcement of the general articles
21. See id. at 752-55.
22. Id. at 761.
23. Id. at 766 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas caustically commented on the majority's analysis:
So far as I can discover the only express exemption of a person in the
Armed Services from the protection of the Bill of Rights is that contained in the Fifth Amendment which dispenses with the need for "a
presentment or indictment" of a grand jury "in cases arising in the land
or naval forces .... "
Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 777 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 772 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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leading to the suppression of dissent in the military. But Blackmun himself feared not suppressed freedom, but anarchy. He
wrote:
The general articles are essential not only to punish patently criminal conduct, but also to foster an orderly and
dutiful fighting force. One need only read the history of
the permissive-and short-lived-regime of the Soviet
Army in the early days of the Russian Revolution to
know that command indulgence of an undisciplined rank
27
and file can decimate a fighting force.
Justice Blackmun suggested that, by their nature, military institutions cannot permit the liberties of civilian life. As detailed in
Part III, this perception was widely shared by eighteenth century
Americans and was one reason for their deep distrust of the military. It is ironic that the same perception which fueled a wariness
of military institutions in the eighteenth century is now offered as
28
a rationale for special deference.
The themes first articulated in Parkerv. Levy were further developed in Brown v. Glines2 9 and the companion case of Secretary of
the Navy v. Huff.3 0 Both Glines and Huff concerned first amendment challenges by members of the Air Force and Marine Corps
to similar sets of military regulations which required prior approval by commanding officers before the circulation of any petition. 3 ' In Glines, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that the challenged Air Force regulations were unconstitutionally overbroad because of the possibility that "virtu32
ally all controversial written material" might be suppressed.
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion written by Justice
Powell and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist. That opinion cited the language from
Parker v. Levy which approved the "different application" of first
27. Id. at 763 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
28. This irony is further developed in Part IV.

29. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
30. 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (per curiam).
31. In addition to challenging the regulations on first amendment grounds,
the servicemen also claimed that the regulations violated a provision of general
military law, 10 U.S.C. § 1034, which limits the military's power to restrict a
member of the armed forces in communicating with a member of Congress.
Glines, 444 U.S. at 351; Huff, 444 U.S. at 456. The Court rejected both the statutory challenge and the constitutional claim. Glines, 444 U.S. at 361.
32. Glines, 444 U.S. at 353 (quoting Glines v. Wade, 586 F.2d 675, 681 (9th

Cir. 1978)).
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amendment protections in the military context.33 Discipline, and
the need to exclude speech which might interfere with discipline,
was the key theme articulated by the Glines majority to support the
34
validity of the regulations.
In his dissent in Glines, Justice Brennan deplored the majority's reliance on "a series of platitudes about the special nature
and overwhelming importance of military necessity." 3 5 Brennan
approached the problem as a straightforward exercise in applying
ordinary first amendment doctrine concerning the right to circulate petitions, and found that this doctrine clearly invalidated the
challenged regulations. Brennan concluded that if the Court had
approached the case with a properly stringent, as opposed to an
"unduly acquiescent," standard of review, there would have been
36
a different result.
Despite his conclusion that these regulations could not stand,
Justice Brennan did recognize that there may be "[m]ilitary (or
national) security" interest which would weigh against first
amendment liberties in certain circumstances. s7 He admitted that
the needs of "military discipline, morale, and efficiency are undeniably important." 3 8 He recognized that in wartime, when national survival itself may be threatened, civil liberties often are
curtailed. Yet he noted that the regulations at issue in Glines and
Huff "apply to all military bases, not merely to those that operate
under combat or near-combat conditions." 39 Justice Brennan
33. Id. at 354 (quoting Parker, 417 U.S. at 758).
34. The majority opinion in Glines referred to "discipline," and the critical
need to maintain it, at least 10 times in the course of a relatively short (12 page)
opinion. See, e.g., id. at 352 ("[Rlequirements of military discipline could justify
otherwise impermissible restrictions on speech."); id. at 357 n.14 ("[T]he prior
approval requirement supports commanders' authority to maintain basic discipline."); id. at 360 ("The unrestricted circulation of collective petitions could
imperil discipline.").
35. Glines, 444 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 370 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 370 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Glines, the serviceman challenging the prior restraint regulations was a captain in the Air Force Reserves serving at Travis Air Force Base in California. While on a routine training flight to
Guam, he circulated a petition protesting grooming standards in the Air Force.
Since he had failed to receive prior approval for this petition as required by the
regulations, it was confiscated and he was demoted. Id. at 351. In Huff, three
servicemen stationed at a Marine Corps Air Station in Japan were either prevented from, or disciplined for, circulating petitions concerning United States
support for the government of South Korea, amnesty for Vietnam draft resisters
and deserters, use of the military in labor disputes, and military restrictions on
petitioning. Id. at 454.
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found the reliance on military necessity in these "rear echelon"
40
situations particularly troubling.

In this regard, the majority opinion in Glines extended the
deferential standard first announced in the Levy case into a new
arena. In Levy, the special demands of the military mission were
invoked by the majority to permit limits on first amendment freedom during a period of actual (if undeclared) war, in the presence
of troops about to enter combat. In Glines, by contrast, this same
deference to the military is relied on in a peacetime setting. As
discussed in Part III, one of the concerns expressed in the eighteenth century controversy over military institutions and civil liberties was the fear that military institutions would expand their
influence beyond periods of war into periods of peace. 4 1 Many
participants in that debate were leery, as Brennan was, of permitting the anti-libertarian pressures of military necessity to persist

into peacetime.
The high court again faced the question of deference to the
military in peacetime when President Carter resumed draft registration in 1980. In Rostker v. Goldberg,42 the registration of males
only was challenged as unconstitutional gender discrimination.
In Rostker, the majority denied this challenge 43 again and articulated a standard of deference in the military arena which expressly
went beyond the ordinary degree of judicial deference to Congress: "[T]his is not, however, merely a case involving the customary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case
arises in the context of Congress' authority over national defense
and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court
44
accorded Congress greater deference."
The Rostker majority cited Parkerv. Levy and Brown v. Glines to

support its position that military matters required an especial degree of judicial deference. 45 In the view of the majority, this deference was appropriate not only because the scope of Congress's
power in the area of national defense and military matters is so
broad, but also because the lack of judicial competence in this
area is so "marked." 46
40. Glines, 444 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. For a discussion of the "standing army" controversy during the drafting
of the Constitution, see infra notes 107-59, 201-14 and accompanying text.
42. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
43. Id. at 78-79.
44. Id. at 64-65.
45. See id. at 66.
46. Id. at 65.
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The Solicitor General had argued that since this issue of potential sex discrimination arose in the area of military affairs, the
Court should drop its normal approach of giving heightened
scrutiny to government action based on sex, and instead apply a
mere rational relation test. 4 7 Although the majority declined to
adopt this "further 'refinement' in the applicable tests," 48 it apparently agreed with the basic premise that decisions involving
military matters need not pass heightened scrutiny. The bottom
line for the majority was that judicial deference must be at its
maximum during the review of claims of unconstitutional government action in the military arena. Just as the standard for reviewing free speech claims against the military became more
deferential than the standard in a civilian context after Levy and
Glines, so the standard for reviewing gender-based discrimination
claims against the military will be much more deferential after
Rostker.
Justice Marshall, in a strong dissent, criticized the majority's
reliance on "hollow shibboleths" about deference. 4 9 He objected
to the majority's sub silentio abandonment of the standards of
review which had characterized all of the Court's earlier "midlevel" scrutiny equal protection decisions.5 0 Yet at the same time,
Justice Marshall did concede that he had "no particular quarrel

with" the majority's notion that particular deference should be
paid to government decision-making in the area of military affairs. 5 ' LikeJustice Brennan in Glines,JusticeMarshall found himself stuck with an uncomfortable incongruity. On the one hand,
he desired to review constitutional claims against the military
under a standard with the same bite as that developed in civilian
cases. On the other hand, he had to acknowledge that the needs

of military institutions seemed to command a different, less rigorous, review. This same internal conflict surfaced even more
sharply in Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Goldman v.
47. The Court has consistently applied a "mid-level" scrutiny test in the
area of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 425 U.S. 190 (1976).
48. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 69.
49. Id. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined both this
dissent and the separate dissenting opinion ofJustice White. Id. at 83 (White, J.,
dissenting).
50. See id. at 104 n.17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall pointed
out that, if the party challenging the gender-based classification has the burden
of proof, this would draw all the Court's earlier sex discrimination jurisprudence
into question.
51. Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Weinberger.52
In Goldman, the high court decided that Air Force Captain
Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew, had no first amendment
right to wear his yarmulke while in uniform. 53 By this time, the
majority's invocation of the now-familiar theme of judicial deference to the military had become almost platitudinous. Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion, however, articulated a degree of
deference even more explicit and farther reaching than that of the
earlier opinions: "Our review of military regulations challenged
on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
54
society."
The Goldman case represents a full flowering of the notion,
first articulated in Levy, that the military is a separate community
subject to separate norms different from those of civilian life.
What is remarkable about the factual context for this opinion,
however, is how strikingly it resembles civilian life. Goldman
worked as a clinical psychologist at a mental health clinic at a California Air Force base.5 5 Even more than in Glines, this carried the
institutional structures of the military, and the constraints that accompany them, far from anything resembling the front lines. Yet,
the majority stressed the same key elements which supported judicial deference in the earlier cases involving more combat-like
conditions: the need for unimpeded military discipline and the
need to rely on military expertise. According to the majority, if
the Air Force was convinced that the wearing of non-uniform
headgear by officers like Captain Goldman would be detrimental
to military discipline, then the officers in the Air Force "are under
no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment. '-5 6 As noted by the dissent, this level ofjudicial
scrutiny bears no relationship to the approach which would be
57
taken in a freedom of religion case in a civilian setting.
While Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion relied heavily on
outrage,5 8 Justice O'Connor concentrated on the idea expressed
52. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
53. Id. at 510.
54. Id. at 507.
55. Id. at 505.
56. Id. at 509.
57. See id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting), id. at 529-30 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
58. See id. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote that the
Court's response to Goldman "is to abdicate its role as principal expositor of the
Constitution and protector of individual liberties in favor of credulous deference
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in earlier dissenting opinions by Justices Brennan and Marshall
that the majority should attempt to apply free exercise jurisprudence derived from civilian cases in the military context, rather
than articulating a more deferential standard of review. 59 Similar
to Justices Brennan and Marshall, however, Justice O'Connor also
ended up acknowledging that it is appropriate to "take account of
the special role of the military" and agreeing that "in order to
fulfill that mission, the military is entitled to take some freedoms
from its members." 60 Although Justice O'Connor pressed the
Court to apply the same freedom of religion standards to military
as to civilian life, she nonetheless ended up quoting with approval
the majority's statement that the military "must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian
life." 6 1 As in the earlier dissents, Justice O'Connor's desire to
bring general constitutional norms to bear on the military continued to bang up against the special, anti-libertarian nature of military life.
For the majority, this tension was resolved by deferring to
the military and disregarding the otherwise applicable constitutional norms. But despite the dissenters' wish to apply neutral
principles of constitutional adjudication to military life, they were
forced to recognize that the special character of military institutions seems to demand something different. While the weakness
of the majority's position was its overly facile disregard of civil
liberties, the weakness of the dissenters' position was its evasion
of the enormous difficulty of reconciling these values with the actual nature of military life.
In United States v. Stanley, 6 2 the divergence among the majority and dissenting positions reached its sharpest point. The majority, continuing to apply its highly deferential approach, denied
Stanley's constitutional claim. 63 The majority adhered to the poto unsupported assertions of military necessity." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
He went on to charge that "[t]oday the Court eschews its constitutionally mandated role. It adopts for review of military decisions affecting First Amendment
rights a subrational-basis standard-absolute, uncritical 'deference to the professional judgment of military authorities.'" Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507).
59. Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("There is no reason why these
general principles should not apply in the military, as well as the civilian,
context.").
60. Id. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
63. Id. at 683-84.
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sition expressed in the earlier cases that the military institutions
must be permitted to make their own evaluations of the requirements of military discipline, whatever the costs in civil liberties.
In Stanley, this broad deference to military judgment was maintained even though the result was to deny liability for secret, nonconsensual experiments on human beings.
The dissenters were outraged by this result. 64 But although
the specific facts of the case appalled them, they continued to acknowledge-as they had in earlier cases-that as a general matter,
the special nature of military life and the needs of military discipline required lessened protection for constitutional rights. 6 5 Is
there any way out of this dilemma? If we wish to preserve constitutional liberties, but recognize that military institutions are by
their nature ill-suited to such liberties, must we be trapped unavoidably in the deadlock between civil rights and military institutions, between liberty and military need? In eighteenth century
America, thinkers who had been wrestling with just this question
thought that they might have an answer. Viewed through the lens
of that earlier debate, perhaps the split between the majority and
the dissent in the Stanley cases can be seen in a new light.
64. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote:
Having invoked national security to conceal its actions, the Government now argues that the preservation of military discipline requires
that Government officials remain free to violate the constitutional
rights of soldiers without fear of money damages. What this case and
others like it demonstrate, however, is that Government officials (military or civilian) must not be left with such freedom.
Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor stated: "In my view, conduct of the type alleged in this case is so far
beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot be
considered as part of the military mission." Id. at 709 (O'ConnorJ, concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
65. For example, Justice Brennan accepted as a general matter that there
was a "need for 'special regulations in relation to military discipline' " in the
context of the uniquely hierarchical and command-driven nature of military life.
Id. at 700 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 426 U.S. 296, 300 (1983)). He concluded that in situations
where immunity from constitutional liability was essential to maintenance of military discipline, such immunity should be granted. Id. at 708 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, Justice O'Connor accepted
"that the special circumstances of the military mandate" require that civilian
courts deny recovery for many injuries caused as a result of military service that
would be otherwise compensable in civilian life. Id. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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HISTORICAL ROOTS

Introduction: The "Standing Army" Debate

Today, when the very phrase "standing army" seems archaic,
it is difficult to appreciate how serious a debate took place at the
time of the framing and ratification of the Constitution about the
possible dangers of such an institution. Yet any reading of the
proceedings at the constitutional convention in Philadelphia and
of the literature supporting and opposing ratification of the proposed constitution reveals that this topic excited strong feelings
among both the leadership and the general public.
The American revolutionary generation had been inspired by
a tradition of English dissent that fervently opposed the maintenance of professional peacetime armies, believing such institutions inevitably dangerous to liberty. 66 Colonial experience with
the hated British army, and revolutionary aspirations to develop
the new continent without the scars of Old World militarism, only
reinforced these ideological predispositions against military
establishments .67
The thinking of the founding generation" was shaped by
these views, and the idea that "standing armies are dangerous to
liberty" 69 was widely held in late eighteenth century America. As
developed below, however, the consensus on this point began to
shatter during the drafting of the Constitution. Some supporters
of the Constitution espoused strong national military institutions
despite a widespread public fear and distrust of them. Others,
however, opposed the proposed Constitution because they believed that it would permit the growth of large standing national
military forces. This opposition to standing armies was one of the
66. For a discussion of the English opposition to standing armies, see infra
notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
67. For a discussion of the colonists' experience with the British standing
army, see infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
treatment of the new nation's military under the Articles of Confederation, see
infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
68. I use the term "founding generation" to cover broadly both those who
were federalist supporters of the Constitution and also those who were in the
anti-federalist opposition. This term not only avoids the unnecessarily patriarchal ring of the conventional "founders" or "founding fathers," but also helps
us to remember that there were significant differences of opinion and outlook, as
well as commonalities, among the members of that generation.
69. This language appeared in the original constitution of Virginia, as well
as in those of a number of other states. For the text of the original Virginia
constitution, see infra note 99 and accompanying text.
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forces behind the demand for the Bill of Rights.70
The questions raised by this "standing army" debate about
the relationship between military institutions and civil liberties remain illuminating today. Of course, this eighteenth century history does not yield any easy contemporary answers. Nonetheless,
it sheds a valuable light on the problem which will help us to re71
frame the issues in an important, useful way.
B.

Ideological Origins of the Opposition to Standing Armies

Ideologically, the founding generation's suspicion of "standing armies" had its roots in English opposition thought of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a republican political tradition which promoted decentralized power and institutions countering the central control of court and crown. 72 The phrase
"standing army" seems to have arisen from the contrast between
the images of a "marching" and a "standing" army: that is, between one "taking the field against a real enemy or present danger" and one not actively engaged in necessary military activity,
but literally "standing around."7 3 An army actively engaged in
necessary military operations might be honorable, but this political tradition considered a permanent professional peacetime
army to be potentially dangerous.
English opposition thought identified two broad categories
of danger in a permanent standing army. First, there were the
dangers that arose from the nature of the institution itself. Ar70. For a discussion of the standing army debate during the formulation of
the Bill of Rights, see infra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
71. Part IV suggests a way to rethink the problem posed by the Stanley cases
in the light of this history.
72. For a discussion of this tradition, and its relationship to American revolutionary thought, see generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); C. ROBBINS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN (1961). For a recent general review of the impact of the republican tradition on the American founding, see Onuf, Reflections on the Founding:
Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 341
(1989). For recent law review literature on this tradition, see Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American ConstitutionalThought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57
(1987); Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). For a
study focusing directly on English opposition thought concerning the military,

see L.

SCHWOERER,

"No

STANDING ARMIESI"

(1974). This English tradition in

turn is said to be rooted in the classical republican tradition which traces back
through the Italian Renaissance to the ancient Greeks. SeeJ. ELSHTAIN, WOMEN
AND WAR

47-71 (1987); J.G.A.

POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLOREN-

TINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLCAN TRADITION

401-22

(1975).
73. J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 72, at 411.
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mies were hierarchical and harshly disciplined: the conjunction
of a commanding, aristocratic officer corps with a servile, lowerclass rank and file was seen as contrary to the free-thinking, independent-spirited character that the English opposition tradition celebrated. The soldiers themselves, being idle and without
civilian occupation or companionship, were prone to moral debauchery and depravity. Since they were not a part of the local
community where they were based, they might well wreck or
plunder neighboring civilians. From an economic point of view, a
"standing army" was a drain on the civilian population; the cost
of its support, whether raised through forced quartering and levies on the local people or through taxes assessed more generally,
was an economic burden without the justification of immediate
military need. Officers and troops alike, becoming accustomed to
being supported without working, might begin to expect such a
free ride.
The second source of danger was that a standing army loyal
to the crown7 4 was potentially a dangerous political tool. Such an
army would strengthen the hand of the monarchy at the expense
of other groups in the population. Troops could be used for repression at home and for costly and vainglorious foreign expeditions abroad to serve the private interests of the crown without
meeting genuine national needs.
As an alternative to the detested "standing army," the English opposition tradition celebrated the ideal of the armed citizenry, known as the militia. The militia had all the virtues which a
professional "standing army" lacked. Composed of free, independent citizens, the militia had no need for either imperious
commanders or slavish followers. When the need for military defense arose, the citizens would band together to defend themselves as necessary; as soon as peace was restored, they would
return to their homes and normal occupations. Unlike a standing
74. Prior to the seventeenth century, the military was understood to be
solely within the prerogative power of the crown, and thus beyond the control of
Parliament or the common law. See A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 7 (1976). One central aspect of the English
revolutionary struggles of the seventeenth century was Parliament's effort to
wrest more control of military power from the crown, an effort which bore significant fruit by the century's end. For further discussion of the struggles between Parliament and the crown, see infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
Even when the legislature attains formal control over the military, however, this
does not erase the continuing problem of executive control. For a contemporary treatment of this problem, see generally Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE LJ. 1255
(1988).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 6 [1990], Art. 1

1026

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: p. 1009

army, therefore, the militia could never become an economic burden. Nor could the militia pose any political danger. Being of the
people, it could never become a tool against the people as could a
standing army in the hands of the crown. Firmly rooted in local
soil and tied to local institutions, the militia could never feed the
ambitions of a centralized court or monarch. Unlike a standing
army which centralized the power of the sword, a militia-based
defense dispersed the coercive power of society, spreading it
widely among the citizens. This ideal was to exert a powerful influence on American thought in the eighteenth century.
C.

The Opposition to Standing Armies in English
Constitutional Thought

The English opposition to standing armies developed and
manifested itself in the course of tumultuous events of English
constitutional history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These events exerted a powerful influence on the thought of
the American founding generation. The 1628 Petition of Right,
for example, which was a crucial turning point in the historical
power struggle between Parliament and the Crown, resulted from
Charles I's attempts to coerce financial support for his standing
army. 75 Parliament, devoid of sympathy for his disastrous foreign
policies, had refused to vote for taxes to support these troops.76
The Petition articulated the key principle of "no taxation without
legislative consent" which would later play such a central role in
the American revolutionary crisis. But in their Petition, Parliament demanded something more than just the right to consent to
the raising of taxes-it wanted the troops actually disbanded.
The Petition prayed that "your majesty would be pleased to remove the said soldiers and mariners; and that your people may
not be so burdened in time to come." 77
75. See The Petition of Right, 1628, reprinted in 1 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF
19 (B. Schwartz ed. 1980) [hereinafter 1 ROOTS].
76. See L. SCHWOERER, supra note 72, at 19. Charles had pursued an unpopular foreign policy which left England embroiled in war on the continent and
which failed to support French and German protestants who had the sympathies
of Parliament. When Parliament refused to support these unpopular policies,
Charles resorted to extra-legal expedients to raise money, including the forced
quartering of troops and the exaction of involuntary loans from the well-to-do.
When several people refused to pay these loans, the legality of which the courts
would not affirm, Charles had a number of them summarily imprisoned. See id.
at 19-25; see also C. HILL, GOD'S ENGLISHMAN 28-29 (1985).
77. The Petition of Right, 1628, supra note 75, at 21. In his commentary on
this document, Schwartz points out that since Sir Edward Coke was one of the
key men behind this Petition in Parliament, and was also a critical intellectual
RIGHTS
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After Parliament overthrew the monarchy and executed the
King in 1649, a tremendous outpouring of constitutional writing
and debate rushed to fill the political vacuum left by his death. In
the feverish discussion of how a post-monarchial commonwealth
should be constituted, the question of how to structure the military emerged as a central concern.
The Levellers, who represented the radical strand of antiroyalist thinking, drew up a proposed constitution for a republican commonwealth called the Agreement of the People. 78 This
constitution, which contained both a framework for establishing a
representative government and also a series of checks on the
powers of that government, later influenced the drafting of the
American Constitution. 79 Restraints on the central government's
military powers were explicitly incorporated into the Agreement.
The first limitation listed in the Agreement was on the legislature's power to compel any military force other than a citizen
militia:
(1) We do not empower [the elected representatives]
to impress or constrain any person to serve in foreign
war, either by sea or land, nor for any military service
within the kingdom; save that they may take order for the
forming, training, and exercising of the people in a military way, to be in readiness for resisting of foreign invasions, suppressing of sudden insurrections, or for
assisting in execution of the laws. 80
Detailed Leveller proposals for structuring the militia gave the
national legislature the power to appoint the militia commanderin-chief and his general staff, but provided that all other officers
were to be elected by the local citizens from the districts in which
the troops were raised. 8'
influence on the American revolutionary leadership, the Petition had a vital impact on the American founding generation. See 1 ROOTS, supra note 75, at 17,
19.
78. See Agreement of the People, 1649, reprinted in 1 ROOTS, supra note 75,
at 24.
79. The Agreement of the People was known to and studied by the "Real
Whigs" or "Commonwealthmen" of the eighteenth century- people like John
Trenchard, Robert Molesworth and Catharine Macaulay-who were important
sources of political inspiration for the founding generation. See B. BAILYN, supra
note 72, at 71-73; C. ROBBINS, supra note 72, at 4, 19, 383.
80. Agreement of the People, 1649, supra note 78, at 27. For a discussion
of the events surrounding the drafting of this document, see C. HILL, supra note
76, at 53-54; L. SCHWOERER, supra note 72, at 90-92, 104-05.

81. L.

SCHWOERER,

supra note 72, at 54.
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It was not only the radicals who opposed standing armies:
opposition came from the right as well as the left.8 2 The influen-

tial tract The Peaceable Militia, which expressed "criticism of the
army from the right,"8 3 pulled together and popularized all of the
arguments discussed earlier against a standing army and in favor
of a militia-based defense.8 4 During this same period, James Harrington, who later was to exercise such an important influence on
the thinking of the American founding generation, wrote The Commonwealth of Oceana,8 5 his utopian vision of an English commonwealth. In Oceana, he paid careful attention to issues of military
power and argued for an armed citizenry of landed yeoman. It
was his view that with the demise of feudalism, either the nowindependent freeholders of the nation would take up arms on
their own behalf so as to constitute a community of armed citizens, or military power would lodge in a standing army beholden
to the king. He thought that if the latter occurred, this would be
86
fatal to the liberties of the nation.
After the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, as Parliament
struggled to reach an acceptable accommodation with the crown,
concern about the dangers of a standing army persisted.8 7 The
1689 Bill of Rights, in which Parliament set out the terms on
which the monarchy would be restored under William and Mary,
specifically included a prohibition against "raising or keeping a
standing army within the kingdom in time of peace" except with
88
the consent of Parliament.
Although many in Parliament were satisfied once the Bill of
Rights recognized that the crown could not raise troops without
parliamentary consent, a continuing radical opposition took the
82. Id. at 55 ("Gentry in and out of Parliament who, on other issues, would
have liked to see the Levellers 'levelled to the very ground' shared their objections to a standing military power .

83. Id.

84. Id. at 56 (quoting

ANONYMOUS, THE PEACEABLE MILrrIA (1648)).

85. See Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, reprinted in THE POLITICAL
WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 210 (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1977).
86. For a discussion of Harrington's thought on these points, see Hardy,
The Second Amendment and the Historiographyof the Bill of Rights, 4J.L. & POL. 1, 1113 (1987); J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 72, at 383-412; L. SCHWOERER, supra note
72, at 64-68; Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 637,647-

48 (1989).
87. See H.

(1680), reprinted in Two REPUBLICAN
This book, which later became wellknown to the American Revolutionary leadership, again expressed abhorrence
of a standing army and promoted reliance on a citizen militia. See L.
SCHWOERER, supra note 72, at 133-34.
88. Bill of Rights, 1689, reprinted in 1 ROOTS, supra note 75, at 41, 43.
NEVILLE, PLATO REDIVIVUS
ENGLISH TRACTS (C. Robbins ed. 1976).
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position that even parliamentary establishment of a standing
peacetime army was dangerous and unconstitutional. This group
believed that national standing armies had no place in society.8 9
In the 1690s, King William's attempt to raise a sizeable army to
fight abroad provoked a new outpouring of anti-army
pamphleteering from such members of this opposition group as
John Trenchard, Algernon Sidney and Robert Molesworth.
Trenchard's 1697 pamphlet, An Argument, Shewing That a Standing
Army Is Inconsistent with a Free Government, and Absolutely Destructive to
the Constitution of the English Monarchy,90 was widely circulated and
read in America as well as in England. These writers were critical
sources of eighteenth century American views. 9 '
D. Colonial Experience
For the founding generation, concrete experience amply reinforced the ideological opposition to standing armies which had
been transmitted across the Atlantic from the English opposition
tradition. From their earliest years, the English colonies had been
embroiled in the local reflections of European wars, including
King William's War (1688-97), Queen Anne's War (1701-14),
King George's War (1740-48), and the French and Indian War
(1756-63).92 Although some in the colonies supported these
wars and grew rich from the commerce associated with them,
others abhorred them as unwanted extensions of Old World
quarrels onto American soil, occasions for increased militarism,
impressment of reluctant colonial soldiers and ever-increasing
93
taxes levied to support the British war effort.
The British plan after the French and Indian War to maintain
89. As one member of the House of Commons put it:
[The raising or keeping up a Standing Army within the kingdom, in
time of peace... is inconsistent with our constitution; for though a law
agreed to by Kings, Lords, and Commons, cannot be said to be against
law, yet it may be, and may properly be said to be, inconsistent with our
constitution.
J.P. REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STANDING ARMY CONTROVERSY, THE
Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 45-46
(1981).
90. B. BAILYN, supra note 72, at 62, 84-85.

91. See id. at 35-37, 43-45, 51-53, 62-65; R.

KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE

FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA,

1783-1802, at 4 (1975); L. SCHWOERER, supra note 72, at 196-200.
92. See L. SMITH, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER: A STUDY OF
CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1951).
93. See A. EKIRCH, JR., THE CIVILIAN AND THE MILITARY 7-8 (1956); H. ZINN,

A

PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

52-53, 59-61 (1980).
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a ten thousand man standing army in the colonies aroused particular opposition. Colonial hatred of the British regulars only grew
more intense in the eighteenth century, when greater numbers of
British military officers and troops were headquartered in the colonies. As is well known, the British red coats headquartered in
Boston after 1768 provoked deep resentment. To the revolutionaries, the Boston Massacre and the declarations of martial law in
Boston and Virginia in 1775 were the concrete manifestations of
all the dangers of a standing army about which the English opposition writers had warned. 94 It was as if the English anti-army ideology, with which the revolutionary generation was so imbued,
had come alive. When Samuel Adams attacked the British military presence in a series of letters in the Boston Gazette, he used
language drawn directly from this tradition:
It is a very improbable supposition that any people
can long remain free, with a strong military power in the
very heart of their country ....

Even where there is a

necessity of the military power, within the land, which by
the way but rarely happens, a wise and prudent people
will always have a watchful and a jealous eye over it; for
the maxims and rules of the army, are essentially different from the genius of a free people, and the laws of a
95
free government.
Just as concrete experience confirmed the colonials'
ideological pre-dispositions against standing armies, so too did
their experience underscore the value of that preferred alternative, the citizen militia. The revolutionary generation enthusiastically adopted the militia as their model for structuring the
national defense. The image of the citizen-soldier drilling on the
town common became central to the Americans' view of themselves as a special people of special virtues, inventing a new world
free from the corruption and decadence of the old. 9 6 As John
94. For a discussion of the conjunction between the presence of the British
troops, the Boston Massacre, and the anti-standing army ideology in the minds
of the revolutionary generation, see B. BAILYN, supra note 72, at 112-16.
95. S. ADAMS, Article Signed "Vindex," in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS
264-65 (H. Cushing ed. 1904).
96. As Thomas Paine put it, in Common Sense, "Every spot of the old world is
overrun with oppression" and "[w]e have it in our power to begin the world
over again." T. PAINE, Common Sense, in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
PAINE 3, 30, 45 (P. Foner ed. 1945). For a general discussion of Paine's utopian
republicanism, see Foner, Tom Paine's Republic: Radical Ideology and Social Change,
in

THE AMERICAN

RADICALISM

REVOLUTION:

EXPLORATIONS

IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN

187-232 (A. Young ed. 1976). Foner links Paine's ideas to the social
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Adams told his audiences in Europe in the 1780s, it was "[t]he
Towns, Militia, Schools and Churches" which were "the source of
'the Virtues and talents of the People.' -97 To the American revolutionaries, it was as if Harrington's utopian Oceana could at last
be born on their virgin soil-a republic of free citizens, harvesting
by the plow and protected by their own swords.
It was not just the imperialist British army which the revolutionary generation hated, but the very idea of a professional army
itself.98 The revolutionaries did not want to leave protection
against such a dreaded "standing army" to chance; they explicitly
incorporated their distaste for military establishments and their
deep attachment to their local militia into their state constitutions. The original constitutions of eight of the states-Delaware,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Virginia- contained language expressly
endorsing the militia as the proper organ of national defense and
disapproving standing armies. 99
The War for Independence, however, drew the revolutionaries into a difficult conflict. The militia alone, however revered,
could not win the war: "[A] standing armyu-no matter how suspect and unwelcome-was necessary."' 100 After the war, what lesand political changes occurring in Philadelphia during the pre-revolutionary period, noting that the institution of the militia played a critical role in these
changes as a "school of political democracy." Id. at 196.

97. R.

supra note 91, at 8 (quoting III DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
195 (L.H. Butterfield ed. -1961)).
98. See C. ROYSTR, A REVOLUrIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR 36 (1979) ("The revKOHN,

JOHN ADAMS

olutionaries felt a strong distaste for an army in repose, an army as an institution, an army as an organ of the state.").
99. The language of Virginia's constitution, the earliest, is typical:
That a well-regulated Militia, composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State;
that Standing Armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as dangerous
to liberty; and that, in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.
Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in 2 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 234, 235 (B. Schwartz ed. 1980) [hereinafter 2 ROOTS]. For the provisions of the other state constitutions, see id. at 266 (Pennsylvania), 278 (Delaware), 282 (Maryland), 287 (North Carolina), 324 (Vermont), 342-43
(Massachusetts) and 378 (New Hampshire).
100. C. ROVSTER, supra note 98, at 37. Royster's argument, developed with
greater subtlety than I can do justice to here, and with an illuminating wealth of
concrete detail, suggests that the experience of fighting the Revolutionary War
led to an internal ambivalence within many Americans between their ideological
distrust of professional armies and their reluctant admiration of the accomplishments of the Continental Army. He suggests that this same experience also led
to an external split between those who came away from the War convinced of
the importance of professional military institutions and eager to strengthen
them, and those who wanted to return as quickly as possible to a demilitarized
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son should the newly independent colonies draw from this
unwelcome military fact? For many, perhaps the majority, the
right answer was to view the military needs of the war as a temporary aberration, to demobilize the army as quickly as possible and
return to reliance on the militia, to put wartime behind them and
move on to civilian pursuits. But others, among them former officers in the Contintental Army, took away a different lesson.
They had come to believe that a permanent professional national
military force was vital. Conflict between these two viewpoints
would continue to flare through the drafting of the constitution,
the ratification debates, and beyond.
E.

The Military in the New Nation

This country's first governance scheme, the Articles of Confederation, put the power of national defense (except for cases of
actual or imminent invasion of the states) into the hands of the
confederation Congress. A complicated mechanism, however,
which carefully protected state control, limited Congress's power
to raise land forces.' 0 ' The states were explicitly prohibited from
raising troops in time of peace without the consent of Congress,
but they were commanded to maintain effective state militia at all
times: "Every state shall always keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred ....
*"102 The
same preference for a militia-based national defense and distrust
of standing armies which had been expressed in the original state
constitutions was now incorporated into the national constitutional structure.
These somewhat ambiguous provisions in the Articles led to
a vociferous debate in the confederation Congress about whether
Congress had any constitutional power at all to raise troops in
civilian life. For a discussion of this split, and its impact on the constitutional
convention and during the ratification debates, see infra notes 107-201 and accompanying text.
101. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, reprinted in M. JENSEN, THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 268-69 (1970). Article IX provides that the Congress may, with the assent of at least nine states, "agree upon" a number of land
forces to be raised, and then requisition each state for its quota, but it is the state
legislatures themselves which are to "appoint the regimental officers, raise the
men and cloath, arm and equip them in a soldier like manner, at the expense of
the united states." Once these troops assemble at the place and time decided on
by the Congress, then it shall have the sole power to make rules for their governance, and to direct their operations.
102. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, reprinted in M. JENSEN, supra note
101, at 265.
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peacetime. 103 In this period, public anti-army sentiment was running very high. In addition to the ideological tradition and antagonistic sentiments toward the British army described above,
public opposition had been fueled by alarm over events occurring
at the end of the Revolutionary War. Former Continental Army
officers created the Society of the Cincinnati, an elite and semisecret organization which many feared might be the source of an
aristocratic coup which would lead to the installation of a ruling
oligarchy in place of the deposed British monarchy. 0 4 For many,
such behavior by former army officers was just another illustration of the dangers posed by professional military establishments
and the need to keep them carefully confined.
Now that the war was finally over, the general population
wanted a quick demobilization. Any talk of creating new peacetime military establishments provoked strong opposition. 0 5 In
New England, sentiment ran particularly high. The Massachusetts legislature, for example, passed a resolution instructing its
congressional delegation to "oppose, and by all ways and means
...prevent the raising of a standing army of any number, on any
pretence what ever, in time of peace."' 1 6 Those who, like Alexander Hamilton, were eager to build a strong national army had to
hold off on their efforts in the face of this overwhelming public
opposition.
F. Debates About the Military at the Constitutional Convention
The delegates who assembled for the constitutional convention in Philadelphia in 1787 were familiar with these arguments
surrounding the structure of the national defense. Indeed, many
had been active participants in the debates of the confederation
period. As a group, these men generally favored strengthening
the central government. They differed, however, in their opin103. R. KOHN, supra note 91, at 40-72.
104. See id. at 52-53. Kohn describes how Elbridge Gerry and fellow New
Englanders, alarmed by the Society of the Cincinnati, the proposals for a permanent national military put forth by Alexander Hamilton and other ex-officers,
and the attempt to create an independent federal city, saw an overall design
tending toward oligarchy and central control. Gerry wrote to Adams, "How
easy the transition from a republican to any other form of Government, however
despotic," and "how ridiculous to exchange a British Administration, for one
that would be equally tyrannical, perhaps much more so!" Id. at 53.
105. See id. at 44-45, 52-53, 55.
106. Id. at 61 (quoting Committee of the House and Senate, Nov. 1, 1784,JouRNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MASSACHUSETTS (Boston, 1784) 2d sess.
174).
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ions of how the government should provide for its military, or
self-defense needs. Some were staunchly anti-army and pro-militia, while others sought a strong national military establishment
as part of a strong central government.
Those who opposed giving the central government expansive
powers to create a permanent national military and who instead
supported a healthy militia system, did so for the reasons already
described. 0 7 Those delegates in the opposite camp, who supported a strong professional national military, had several reasons. Delegates who had been Continental Army officers and
staff' 0 8 remembered how hard it had been to raise, field, and provision the army under the suspicious eye of the Continental Congress. 10 9 They were eager to increase the ability of military men
to generate the resources they believed necessary to field an effective military force. There was also great concern on the part of
many delegates about the danger of internal rebellion in the new
nation, and the need for effective military power to suppress it.
Shays' Rebellion in western Massachusetts in the summer of
1786 had made a strong impression on many who attended the
Convention. Secretary of War Henry Knox, for example,
"painted lurid pictures of anarchy and imminent civil war" after
travelling in his home state of Massachusetts." l0 This description
prompted Washington and others to alarmed concern about the
need for a national military force to combat such popular upheaval.lIl Remembering the bitter and unresolved debates about
whether Congress had the power under the Articles of Confederation to raise troops in peacetime, these delegates wanted the military powers of the new national government to be clear.
The key question the delegates had to resolve in structuring
107. For a discussion of the reasons underlying opposition to a permanent
national army, see supra notes 72-74, 93-95 and accompanying text.
108. George Washington, Henry Knox, Alexander Hamilton, Timothy
Pickering, Henry Lee and Charles C. Pinckney were among the delegates who
had been Continental Army officers. The United States Army continues to this
day to take "special pride" in these "Soldier-Statesmen" who were among the
nation's founders, noting that they "had become convinced by their wartime
experiences in the Army that a strong central government was essential." U.S.
ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, THE UNITED STATES ARMY BICENTENNIAL

SERIES: THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
109. See C. ROYSTER, supra note 98, at 66; L. SMITH,
110. R. KOHN, supra note 91, at 74.

supra note 92, at 22.

111. Id. For a general discussion on Shays' Rebellion and its powerful impact on the thinking of convention delegates, see SHAYS' REBELLION: SELECTED
ESSAYS (M. Kaufman ed. 1987); L. SMITH, supra note 92, at 17-18; A. SOFAER,
supra note 74, at 18-25; H. ZINN, supra note 93, at 90-95.
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the country's military forces was whether to retain the decentralized state militia system as the heart of the national defense or to
authorize and encourage the creation of a professional military
establishment at the national level. 122 Disagreements over this issue ultimately revealed the fault line which would split the federalist delegates from those who would join the anti-federalist
opposition and plunge the country into the turbulent ratification
debate.
The issue of Congress's power to raise troops was in contention from the beginning of the convention. In his opening address to the delegates on the first day, Edmund Randolph
identified the lack of a national troop-raising power as one of the
specific "defects" of the Articles of Confederation." 13 Nonetheless, his "Virginia Plan" did not specify any particular troop-raising power. It apparently assumed one, however, for it included a
clause giving the national legislature the power "to call forth the
force of the Union [against] any member of the Union failing to
I 4
fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.""
The alternative plans by South Carolina (the Pinckney Plan)
and New Jersey do not appear to have contained any particular
innovations in this area." l 5 But Alexander Hamilton's strongly
nationalistic plan clearly stated that total control over the military
should be transferred from the states to the national government.
112. A separate, but importantly related question, was whether the power
over war and peace-agreed by all to be a national power- should be controlled
by the legislative or the executive branch of the central government. Although
close attention to this topic is beyond the scope of this article, it is instructive
that those like Elbridge Gerry, who were most suspicious of professional military
establishments, were also most adamant that Congress, not the executive
branch, must hold the war power. Gerry's response to Pierce Butler's suggestion that the President should have the power to declare war is famous: he
"never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone

to declare war:" 2

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787, at 318

(M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 2 RECORDS]. The proper allocation of
this power between the legislative and executive branches has continued to be
the subject of much political debate throughout American history, as well as

much scholarly commentary. See, e.g., T.

EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL

POWER (1974); C.
MANDER IN CHIEF

RossrrER & R. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COM(expanded ed. 1976); King & Leavens, Curbing the Dog of War.
The War Powers Resolution, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 55 (1977); Koh, supra note 74;
Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE
L.J. 672 (1972).

113. 1 THE

RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787, at 19 (M. Far-

rand rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 1 RECORDS].
114. Id. at 21.

115. For the text of the Pinckney Plan, see 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
at 595 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 3

CONVENTION OF 1787,
RECORDS]. For the text

of the New Jersey Plan, see id. at 611.
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Article XI of his proposal read: "No State to have any forces land
or Naval; and the Militia of all the States to be under the sole and
exclusive direction of the United States, the officers of which to be
' 6
appointed and commissioned by them." "
After debating these various proposals, the delegates directed the Committee of Detail to draw up a draft plan incorporating their views. That draft, in the provisions relevant to this
discussion, gave Congress the powers "[t]o raise armies; [t]o
build and equip fleets; [and] [t]o call forth the aid of the militia, in
order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions."" 7 When the "raise armies"
clause came up for discussion on August 18, Nathaniel Gorham of
Massachusetts moved to add the words "and support" after
"raise." Thus amended, the clause was agreed to." 8 Elbridge
Gerry, who had earlier led opposition in the Confederation Congress to the creation of a peacetime army, spoke out against the
amendment. As Madison's notes report:
Mr. Gerry took notice that there was [no] check here
agst. standing armies in time of peace. The existing
Congs. is so constructed that it cannot of itself maintain
an army. This wd. not be the case under the new system.
The people were jealous on this head, and great opposition to the plan would spring from such an omission....
He thought an army dangerous in time of peace & could
never consent to a power to keep up an indefinite
number. He proposed that there shall not be kept up in
time of peace more than - thousand troops. His idea
was that the blank should be filled with two or three
thousand.' '9
Gerry and Luther Martin later made a formal motion to limit
the number of peacetime troops: "provided that in time of peace
20
the army shall not consist of more than - thousand men."'
Madison's notes indicate that several delegates spoke against this
motion, feeling it would cramp necessary peacetime preparations
for war. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina reminded Martin
and Gerry that George Mason's suggestion of a time limitation on
116. 1 RECORDS, supra note 113, at

283.

117. 2 RECORDS,supra note 112, at 182.
118. Id. at 329-33.
119. Id.

120. Id. at 330.
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the appropriation of revenue for raising troops would be "the
best guard" against abuse. 2 1 The motion was voted down.' 22
The delegates then moved on to discuss the militia. George
Mason had suggested that a federal power to regulate the militia
should be added to the list of legislative powers. 123 Mason later
made a formal motion to give the central government the power
"to make laws for the regulation and discipline of the Militia."' 24
General Pinckney, citing unfortunate experiences with different
state militias during the war, agreed, saying: "Uniformity was essential. The States would never keep up a proper discipline of
their militia."' 25 Oliver Ellsworth from Connecticut thought Mason's motion "went too far."' 26 Although Ellsworth accepted
federal control over the militia when it was in the actual service of
the United States, or when the states failed to provide regulations
themselves, he believed that "[t]he whole authority over the Militia ought by no means to be taken away from the States."' 2 7 John
Dickinson of Delaware agreed, saying "the States never would
nor ought to give up all authority over the Militia."' 128 Mason,
perhaps sensing resistance to his original motion, suggested a
compromise-the so-called "select militia."' 29 Under this compromise, a small portion (he suggested one-tenth) of each state's
militia would be put under federal control each year, thereby
gradually extending federal discipline to the entire body.' 30
General Pinckney and Madison, however, wanted to stick
with Mason's original motion. Madison argued that just as the
power of the purse was being entrusted to the central govern121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Madison wrote the following report:
[Mason] thought such a power necessary to be given to the Genl. Government. He hoped there would be no standing army in time of peace,
unless it might be for a few garrisons. The Militia ought therefore to be
the more effectually prepared for the public defence. Thirteen States
will never concur in any one system, if the disciplining of the Militia be
left in their hands. If they will not give up the power over the whole,
they probably will over a part as a select militia. He moved as an addition to the propositions just referred to the Committee of detail, & to
be referred in like manner, "a power to regulate the militia."
2 RECORDS, supra note 112, at 326.
124. Id. at 331.
125. Id. at 330.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 331.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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ment under this constitution, so too should be the power of the
sword. General Pinckney went on to reveal.that in any event the
militia was not his primary concern: "[I have] but a scanty faith in
Militia. There must be [also] a real military force-This alone can
[effectually answer the purpose]. The United States had been
making an experiment without it, and we see the consequence in
'
their rapid approaches toward anarchy. "151

Roger Sherman of Connecticut took issue with Madison's attempt to draw a parallel between the powers of the purse and of
the sword. The states, he said, had not given up their power of
taxation to the federal government, but retained a concurrent
power to raise money for their own use.15 2 Similarly, he doubted
that the states would agree to give up their power of the sword.
Gerry agreed, saying that if such a surrender were incorporated
into the Constitution, the document would "have as black a mark
as was set on Cain." 1 33 Mason's original motion, as well as an
alternative version allowing the states to retain control over "such
part of the Militia as might be required ...

for their own use,"

were committed to the Committee of Eleven.'5 4
Despite the earlier defeat of the Martin-Gerry amendment
limiting. troop size, the subject of placing a constitutional limit on
the government's power to maintain a standing army reappeared.
On August 20, the delegates referred three new proposals concerning military establishments to the Committee of Detail: first,
"[n]o troops shall be kept up in time of peace, but by consent of
the Legislature;" second, "[t]he military shall always be
subordinate to the Civil power, and no grants of money shall be
made by the Legislature for supporting military Land forces, for
more than one year at a time;" and third, a prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers in private homes in peacetime without the
consent of the owners.'1

5

Meanwhile, the Committee of Eleven had prepared its own
suggested clause addressing federal power over the militia: "To
make laws for organizing, arming & disciplining the Militia, and
for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the U.S. reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and authority of training the militia
131. Id. at 332. According to a footnote in Madison's notes, Pinckney was
referring to Shays' Rebellion. Id.

132. Id.
133. Id. at 332.
134. Id. at 333.

135. Id. at 341.
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according to the discipline prescribed." 1 3 6 The delegates discussed this clause on August 23, arguing back and forth about the
advantages and disadvantages of centralizing control over the militia. Madison strongly supported a national approach: "The Discipline of the Militia is evidently a National concern, and ought to
be provided for in the National Constitution.' i3 7 The first part of
the proposed clause, up to the "reserving" language, was approved by the group.138
Madison then suggested amending the next part to read "reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers,
under the rank of General officers. "'3 9 This prompted strong outcries

from both Connecticut's Roger Sherman and Massachusetts's
Gerry. Sherman said he "considered this as absolutely inadmissible ....If the people should be so far asleep as to allow the Most
influential officers of the Militia to be appointed by the Genl.
Government, every man of discernment would rouse them by
sounding the alarm to them."' 140 And Gerry suggested with bitter
irony:
Let us at once destroy the State Govts have an Executive
for life or hereditary, and a proper Senate, and then
there would be some consistency in giving full powers to
the Genl Govt. .

.

. He warned the Convention agst

pushing the experiment too far. Some people will support a plan of vigorous Government at every risk.
Others of a more democratic cast will oppose it with
equal determination. And a Civil war may be produced
14
by the conflict.

1

Suddenly, on the seemingly minor point of the power to appoint general militia officers, the chasm between the federalists
and the anti-federalists split open. To eighteenth-century eyes,
there could be no better symbol of the people's loss of power to
their government than the transfer of the power of the sword. In
the tradition of the Leveller's Agreement of the People or Harrington's Commonwealth of Oceana, the dispersion of liberty

throughout the society was embodied in the notion of an armedcitizenry, a militia, rather than a centralized, professional army.
136. Id. at 384-85.
137. Id. at 387 (emphasis in original).

138. Id. at 387-88.
139. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
140. Id.
141. Id
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In this tradition, the local militia was both metaphor and actuality:
metaphor for the self-governing community of citizens 42 and actuality of the active practice of that citizenship to guard against
the corruption of the central state.
Interestingly, Madison countered these fears about the undermining of the state militias not by a defense of centralization,
1 43
but by invoking the even-greater fear of standing armies.
Madison may have genuinely believed that only a strengthened
national militia system could avoid the far-worse prospect of a national standing army. Earlier in the convention he had expressed
his belief that without stronger national union, the states would
fall into "incessant wars" like those in Europe, and raise standing
44
armies that would "not long be safe companions to liberty."
Other delegates, however, like General Pinckney and Hamilton, had already made it clear that they thought it was foolish to
rely on the militia. They saw all militia issues as secondary; their
true goal was, as Pinckney had already indicated, to establish a
professional national military force.' 45 Gouvernor Morris, an active participant in the convention and a strong nationalist, provided some evidence that many convention delegates shared this
disdain for the militia. In a letter written many years after the
convention, he stated:
When, in framing the Constitution, we restricted so
closely the power of government over our fellow citizens
of the militia, it was not because we supposed there
would ever be a Congress so mad as to attempt tyrannizing over the people or militia, by the militia. The
danger we meant chiefly to provide against was, the haz142. Of course, it should not be forgotten that citizenship at the time was

limited to propertied white males. Although considerable progress had been
made in some states in democratizing the militia, nowhere did it include blacks,

native Americans or women. For a discussion of the democratization of the military, see H. APTHEKER, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70, 85 (1960); Foner, supra
note 96, at 195-96. For a discussion of the exclusion of women from the military
and its consequences for republican ideology, see J. ELSHTAIN, supra note 72, at
70-71; Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNs 37

(1987).
143. 2 RECORDS, supra note 112, at 388. Madison declared: "[A]s the
greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is best to prevent
them by an effectual provision for a good Militia." Id.
144. 1 RECORDS,supra note 113, at 464-65. For a discussion of Madison's
repetition of these arguments in support of ratification in The Federalist Papers,
see infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.

145. For a discussion of Hamilton's and Pinckney's views, see supra notes
116 (Hamilton) & 131 (Pinckney) and accomanying text.
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arding of the national safety by a reliance on that expensive and inefficient force....
Those, who, during the Revolutionary storm, had
confidential acquaintance with the conduct of affairs,
knew well that to rely on militia was to lean on a broken

reed. 146
Whether the reason was genuine concern for the local autonomy of the militia or a disguised attempt, as Morris later suggested, to sabotage that institution, the delegates voted down
Madison's motion to permit the central government to appoint
general militia officers and left the power of appointing all militia
officers explicitly to the states. '4 7 The clause giving the states the
authority to train the militia was also approved by the delegates.' 48 A final change relevant to limiting central control over
the militia transpired when the clause making the President the
Commander in Chief "of the Army and Navy," which had originally also made him Commander in Chief "of the Militia of the
several States," was amended to add "when called into the actual
14 9
service of the United States."'
On September 5, the Committee of Eleven brought forward
its version of Mason's proposal to put a time limit on appropriations for a standing army. The suggestion was made to add to the
clause "to raise and support armies" the words "but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two
years." 50 Once again, Elbridge Gerry rose in opposition. Why
had the originally suggested limitation of one year been extended
to two? The clause, he said, "implied there was to be a standing
army which he inveighed against as dangerous to liberty, as unnecessary... and if necessary, some restriction on the number &
Sherman agreed with Gerry
duration ought to be provided."''
restriction
on the number and
"like
a
reasonable
that he would
52
Nonetheless, the
continuance of an army in time of peace."'
clause was approved without modification.
Even at the very end of the process, when the final draft of
the proposed Constitution was before the convention, the provi146. 3

RECORDS,

supra note 115, at 420-21 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966).

147. 2

RECORDS,

supra note 112, at 388.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
Id.
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sions concerning the military 5" remained a source of concern for
some delegates. George Mason, seconded this time by Edmund
Randolph, tried once again to insert some language concerning
the dangers of standing armies. Although saying he was "sensible
that an absolute prohibition of standing armies in time of peace
might be unsafe," he wished "to insert something pointing out
and guarding against the danger of them."4 He moved to
preface the clause concerning Congress's power over the militia
with the words, "And that the liberties of the people may be better secured against the danger of standing armies in time of

peace.

... 155

James Madison spoke in favor of this motion:

"[A]s armies in time of peace are allowed on all hands to be an
evil, it is well to discountenance them by the Constitution, as far
as will consist with the essential power of the Govt. on that
head."' 5 6 His notes indicate, however, that several others opposed the motion. Gouvenor Morris stated that such language
would set "a dishonorable mark of distinction on the military
class of Citizens."' 5 7 The motion to add the language did not
pass.
Martin, Gerry, Mason and Randolph all left the convention
with their concerns about standing armies unallayed. Martin left
153. The relevant final provisions read:
Art. I, Sect. 8
The Congress shall have Power....
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress ....
Art. II, Sect. 2
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States ....
I& at 655-56, 659.
154. 2 RECORDS, supra note 112, at 616-17.
155. Id.
156. I& at 617.
157. Id
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Philadelphia early and became a leader of the anti-federalist opposition to ratification of the Constitution. In a key speech to the
Maryland legislature in November, he identified the power to establish a national standing army as one critical defect in the plan:
By the eighth section of the first article, the Congress have also the power given them to raise and support armies, without any limitation as to numbers, and
without any restriction in time of peace. Thus, Sir, this
plan of government, instead of guarding against a standing army, that engine of arbitrary power, which has so
often and so successfully been used for the subversion of
freedom, has in its formation given it an express and
constitutional sanction ....

... If after having retained to the general government the great powers already granted, and among
those, that of raising and keeping up regular troops without limitations, the power over the militia should be
taken away from the States, and also given to the general
government, it ought to be considered as the last coup
de grace ....158

Gerry, Mason and Randolph decided not to sign the proposed
Constitution. Each mentioned the unrestrained power to raise
standing armies as among their reasons for refusal. 15 9
G.

The Ratification Debates

These concerns about a national military establishment became one important theme of the anti-federalist opposition to the
Constitution. Because the anti-federalists were a diverse group,
representing not a single political program or theory, but a whole
host of sectional and individual points of view, it would be misleading to discuss their position as if it were a unitary one. Nonetheless, they shared a certain common ground. They represented
"a somewhat inchoate, but compelling vision of politics that dif158. 3

RECORDS, supra note 115, at 207-09 (emphasis omitted).
159. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 112, at 633 (Gerry objects to power to "raise
armies and money without limit"); id at 563 (Randolph objects to "want of limitation to a standing army"); id. at 637, 640 (Mason objects to absence of declaration of rights, which should include, inter alia, provisions "against the danger of
standing armies in time of peace").
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fers critically from that of the Constitution. ' 16 In this vision,
anti-federalist fears about the dangers of a standing army and
anti-federalist support for the state militia played a central role.
The anti-federalist vision, as various scholars have described
it,16I was localist, republican and committed to the maximum actual participation of the citizen in the governance of the community. Where federalists sought a larger, more powerful, more
efficient, commercial nation, to be run by a national elite, antifederalists believed in the virtues of local self-government, in the
voice of the average citizen; a kind of town meeting view of politics in which all had their say and all retained their liberties. In
the federalist view, a more powerful national military was a natural and necessary part of the next phase of American development. 16 2 The anti-federalists, in contrast, were more interested in
creating the conditions for the citizens' pursuit of happiness at
home than in making America an impressive player on the world
63
stage.1
Distrust of a standing army and preference for a citizen militia were natural constituent parts of this anti-federalist vision.
160. Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-federalists, Federalists,and the
Constitution (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REv. 340, 341 (1982).
161. See C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS (1985); RATIFYING THE CONSTI-

TrrIoN (M. Gillespie & M. Lienesch eds. 1989); 1 THE COMPLETE AIM-FEDERALiST 3-6 (H. Storing ed. 1981). Recent scholarship has attempted to redress the
relative neglect of the anti-federalists in the past, emphasizing that understanding of anti-federalist thinking is crucial to a full understanding of the founding
period. See Finkelman, Antifederalists: The Loyal Opposition and the American Constitution (Book Review), 70 CORNELL L. REV. 182, 183 (1984) ("Through Storing's
volumes we see that, for our constitutional history, the arguments of the losers
are just as important as those of the winners."); Onuf, supra note 72, at 368
("IT]he idea that the founding properly embraces both the drafting of the Constitution and the debates over its adoption suggests that the Antifederalists
played a much more positive role than is customarily allowed."); Symposium,
Roads Not Taken: Undercurrentsof Republican Thinking in Modern Constitutional Theory, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1-249 (1989).
162. See Eubanks, New York: Federalism and the Political Economy of Union, in
RATIFYING THE CONSTrrTuTION, supra note 161, at 303-04, 333 ("Having fought a
successful revolution, they were now intent on building an empire.").
163. As one of the delegates put it in the opening days of the constitutional
convention:
Our true situation appears to me to be this-a new extensive
Country containing within itself the materials for forming a Government capable of extending to its citizens all the blessings of civil & religious liberty--capable of making them happy at home. This is the
great end of Republican Establishments. We mistake the object of our
government, if we hope or wish that it is to make us respectable abroad.
Conquest or superiority among other powers is not or ought not ever
to be the object of republican systems.
1 RECORDS, supra note 113, at 402.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss6/1

36

Levin: The Deference That Is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judici

1990]

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE MILITARY

1045

For all the same reasons articulated by the English anti-army opposition more than one hundred years earlier,16 4 the unrestrained
national power to raise standing armies seemed inevitably dangerous to the anti-federalists. The very institution of a standing
army was suspect: it trampled on liberty; it created potentially
crushing national debt; it strengthened the executive at the expense of representative bodies; it centralized power instead of diffusing it. Unlike the militia, which embodied yeoman virtue, a
standing army bred aristocracy and corruption.
Federalists accused anti-federalists of pandering to the popular dislike of the professional military without any genuine cause
for alarm. They tried to dismiss the anti-federalist opposition to
standing armies as mere rhetoric, claiming their opponents had
no realistic grasp of national defense needs.' 65 Some contemporary scholars have expressed this same view.' 66 Although it may
be true that anti-federalists played on the popular hatred of
standing armies for its propaganda value, as no doubt the federalists also attempted to play on popular fears and emotions in their
own campaign, this view does not do justice to the anti-federalist
position.
The anti-federalists objected to the federalists' aggressive,
empire-building approach to nationhood. They did not believe
the federalists' claim that their only reason for wanting a standing
army was to maintain a small number of troops for necessary
guard duty at frontier garrisons or public arsenals. Instead, they
believed that the federalist desire for a constitutionally unrestrained national troop-raising power was driven by a set of
broader goals. 16 7 When the federalistJames Wilson stressed the
need for troops in order to give the new nation an "appearance of
164. For a discussion of the reasons for the English opposition to standing
armies, see supra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 406 (H.
Storing ed. 1981) [hereinafter 2 ANrI-FEDERALIST] (Brutus writes that federalists
have "ridiculed the objection [to standing armies], as though it originated in the
distempered brain of its opponents"); Essays by Cincinnatus, in 6 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 16-17 (H. Storing ed. 1981) [hereinafter 6 ANTI-FEDERALIST]
(Cincinnatus counters federalist James Wilson's charge that concern about
standing army is mere "popular declamation"); Essays by a[Maryland]Farmer,in 5
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 16 [hereinafter 5 ANTI-FEDERALIST] (Maryland
Farmer refutes federalist claim that anti-federalist concern about standing army
is just "a bugbear, an hobgoblin to frighten children").
166. See, e.g., C. KENYON, supra note 161, at civ, cvii (noting anti-federalists'
ideological fixation on "bete noire" of a standing army); L. SCHWOERER, Supra
note 72, at 181, 189 (anti-army writers were "parochial" and "ill-informed about
international affairs").
167. See, e.g., Essays of Brutus, supra note 165, at 415 (Brutus states that anti-
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strength" and "dignity,"1's and when Alexander Hamilton wrote
about sufficient military power to make the country "respectable"
among European nations and not "despicable by its weakness,"16 9 the anti-federalists saw these words as signs of the larger
federalist design.
An anti-federalist writing under the name of "Cincinnatus,"
for example, pointed out that Wilson gave as one of the reasons
for the necessity of a standing peacetime army the need to ensure
that the country would be in a position to declare war on
others.' 70 Calling this a "most warlike paragraph," Cincinnatus
wondered whether invasions of "Great-Britain, France, Spain,
Portugal, or all together" are contemplated under the new Constitution.' 71 He warned his readers to understand "that one
blessing of the constitution will be, the taxing [of] them to support fleets and armies to conquer other nations, against whom the
ambition of their new rulers may declare war."' 172 Referring to
Wilson's statement that a national military force is necessary for
the "dignity and safety" of the nation, Cincinnatus ironically commented that safety can be assured by the militia, "[b]ut for the
dignity of the country, that is for the ambition of its rulers, armies
I confess are necessary; and not less in number than other ambi1
tious rulers maintain." 73

Similarly, a "Son of Liberty" listed "[a] standing army, that
bane to freedom" as the first in a series of "curses" that the new
Constitution would bring about. 174 He suggested that, under the
new Constitution, militia-members will be dragged from state to
state, under federal control, to quell slave revolts or "subdue
their fellow citizens."' 75 Moreover, he stated, the country will be
"perpetually involved in the wars of Europe, to gratify the ambitious views of their ambitious rulers, by which the country will be
continually drained of its men and money."' 176
federalist opposition to military establishments not triggered by plans merely to
raise small numbers of troops for guard duty).
168. Wilson, An Address to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 530 (B. Schwartz ed. 1980).
169. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 69 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
170. Essays by Cincinnatus,supra note 165, at 16.
171. Id. at 16-17.
172. Id at 17.
173. Id.
174. Objections by a Son of Liberty, in 6 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 165, at 34
(emphasis in original).
175. Id. at 35 (emphasis in original).
176. Id.
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A "New Hampshire Farmer," again invoking the dangers of
standing armies in time of peace, argued that war should be defensive only: "War is justifiable on no other principle than self-defence, it is at best a curse to any people . . it ought ever to be
avoided if possible; nothing but self-defence can justify it."177 He
went on to argue that the militia would be sufficient for defensive
purposes alone, suggesting that the federalist desire for standing
78
armies was linked to a more aggressive national policy.'
John DeWitt, of Massachusetts, saw no need for standing armies unless the country was invaded. 179 A "Columbian Patriot,"
believed to be Mercy Otis Warren, foresaw that the country's new
military power would not be for genuine national defense, but to
"maintain... the splendour of the most useless part of the community." 810 In their view of history, inherited from Trenchard,
Sidney, Molesworth, and the other English opposition writers, armies did not keep nations free; rather, citizens maintained their
liberty in republics defended by militias.' 8 ' They believed that
liberty would be lost with the drive toward empire and the rise of
.

82

standing armies.'
In these arguments against standing armies, there was no
sharp line between the kinds of concerns that today we would label political and those that we would call civil libertarian, i.e., between those focused on collective liberty and those focused on
individual rights. 83 The anti-federalists naturally linked these
categories, since they believed that the purpose of a properly
177. Essays by a [New Hampshire]Farmer,in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 207 (H. Storing ed. 1981) [hereinafter 4 ANT -FEDERALIST].
178. See id. at 207 ("Organize your militia, arm them well, and under Providence they will be a sufficient security.").
179. Essays ofJohn DeWitt, in 4 Ar-FEDERALIST, supra note 177, at 39.
180. Observations on the New Constitution,and on the Federaland State Conventions
by a Columbian Patriot, in 4 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 177, at 277.
181. See Essay of a DemocraticFederalist, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTi-FEDERALIST
62 (H. Storing ed. 1980) [hereinafter 3 ANTi-FEDERALIST]; Essays by Cincinnatus,
supra note 165, at 16; Essays by a [Maryland]Farmer,supra note 165, at 27-28.
182. See Essays of Brutus, supra note 165, at 413; Essays ofJohn DeWitt, supra
note 177 at 37; Essays by a [Maryland]Farmer, supra note 165, at 22-25.
183. See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention
of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents [hereinafter Pennsylvania Address], in 3 ArmFEDERALIST, supra note 181, at 164. In the address, the anti-federalist delegates
to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention wrote that a standing army and the federal control of the militia would lead to "the destruction of all liberty, both public
and private; whether of a personal, civil or religious nature." Id. at 164 (emphasis
added). This report combines discussion of both the political effects of a centralized military and the impact on individuals. See Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1532-35 (1974) (discussion of "the republican penchant for rights that
bridge the personal and the political").
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structured society was to sustain individual liberty, while the purpose of individual liberty was to be able to participate fully and
freely in community life.
The anti-federalists worried about the direct impact on the
individual of a shift from a decentralized militia system to a centralized national military, as well as about its destructive political
effects on society as a whole. They objected, for example, to the
prospect of individuals being sent out of state to forcibly subdue
rebellions which in conscience they might not support.' 8 4 They
were disturbed by the absence of any protection for conscientious
objectors, concerned that individuals would be forced to serve in
a national army despite their religious beliefs.'8 5 They feared the
subjection of members of the standing army and of a nationallycontrolled militia to military regimes of law and discipline.18 6 In
the military, martial law, which they despised, replaced the common law; the court-martial replaced the jury trial; and rigid hierarchy and discipline replaced equality and respect among men.
The political dangers of institutionalizing reliance on military establishments were mirrored by the harm to individual citizens.
At its core, the anti-federalists viewed the federalist insistence on strengthened national military power as a sign that government by coercion was to be substituted for government by
respect. The federalists, as they saw it, had a bellicose view of the
world and their fellow citizens: they believed that one must anticipate frequent wars with other nations and be prepared, on the
domestic front, to crush rebellion and anarchy by force. Decrying
this as the triumph of force over reason and affection,' 87 the antifederalists rejected this world view. They hoped for an America
that would live at peace with other nations, and for a government
at home that would command obedience by respect rather than
184. See The Letters of Centinel, in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 165, at 159;
Objections by a Son of Liberty, supra note 174, at 35; PennsylvaniaAddress, supra note
183, at 164.
185. See Address of the Albany Antifederal Committee, in 6 ANTI-FEDERAMST, supra
note 165, at 122, 123; Essays of an Old Whig, in 3 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
181, at 36; Letters of Centinel, supra note 184, at 159; Pennsylvania Address, supra
note 183, at 164.
186. See Essays of Brutus, supra note 165, at 407; Essays by the ImpartialExaminer, in 5 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 165, at 172, 181; Letters of Centinel, supra
note 184, at 159.
187. See Essays of Brutus, supra note 165, at 370-71; Essays ofJohn DeWitt, supra
note 179, at 39-40; Letters of Cato, in 2 ANTI-FEDE RALIST, supra note 165, at 111;
Observations Leading to a FairExamination of the System of Government Proposed by the
Late Convention, in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 165, at 231-34.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss6/1

40

Levin: The Deference That Is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judici

1990]

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE MILrrIARY

1049

by fear. They chided the federalists for having given up on these
aspirations. As expressed by the anti-federalist John DeWitt:
If the people are not in general disposed to execute the
powers of government, it is time to suspect there is
something wrong in that government, and rather than
employ a standing army, they had better have another;
for, in my humble opinion, it is yet much too early to set
it down for a fact, that mankind cannot be governed, but
by force.' 88
The popular appeal of these arguments can be gauged by the
considerable effort which the authors of the Federalist Papers devoted to responding to this anti-federalist critique. "Publius," the
pseudonymous author of the influential essays, directed much attention to proving the need for a stronger national military, both
to deal with military threat from abroad' 8 9 and to stave off dissension and deal with "domestic factions and convulsions" at
home. 19° Yet while the two principal authors of these essays,
Hamilton and Madison, shared the conclusion that the national
military power authorized by the new Constitution was both necessary and desirable, their respective contributions on this subject
differ considerably in tone.
Hamilton, who would make support of a sizable national
army a central theme of his political career, 19 1 premised his position on the bellicose view of human nature disputed by the antifederalists. In The FederalistNo. 34, Hamilton expressed his belief
that "the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human
breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace."' 92 Thus, he reasoned, the government must have military powers "without limitation."'' 93 Reading
Hamilton's lengthy defense of the military provisions of the Constitution,' 94 one can sense his eagerness to dispense with the foolish objections of those who are, in the words of his colleagueJohn
188. Essays of John DeWitt, supra note 179, at 39-40.
189. See, e.g., THE FEDERALST Nos. 3-4 (J.Jay), 41 (J. Madison).
190. See THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 28 (A. Hamilton) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
191. For the story of Hamilton's role in the creation of the national military
establishment, see generally R. KOHN, supra note 91; F. McDONALD, ALEXANDER
HAMILTON (1979).
192. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 212 (A. Hamilton)

(J. Cooke ed. 1961).
193. Id. at 214.
194. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6, 8, 11, 22-26, 28-30, 34, and 69 (A.
Hamilton).
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Jay, "seduced by a too great fondness for peace."'' 9 Despite
Hamilton's own impatience with the anti-army position, however,
he obviously recognized its popular strength, and strove to reassure his readers. He claimed that even though the proposed Constitution contained no explicit limitations on the power to raise
troops, no large army would be created. The militia would remain the "natural defence for a free country."' 196 Yet, even as he
tried to be reassuring, his true opinions surfaced. He warned
against being "dupes" of the suggestion that a militia could defend the country, 197 or taken in by "the novel and absurd experiment in politics, of tying up the hands of government from
offensive war."' 98 His polemical contributions, despite their attempts to reassure, actually appear to support the anti-federalist
view that the federalists wanted a sizable standing army for potential military adventure abroad and repression of dissent at home.
Madison, on the other hand, appeared to agree with the antifederalists that there were serious dangers connected with standing armies. Indeed, he identified these dangers as a reason for
supporting the military provisions of the Constitution. He
claimed that the anti-federalists had gotten it wrong, that stronger
national unity would actually decrease the likelihood of the existence of standing armies. Stronger national unity, he argued,
would "exhibit[] a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition"
and prevent the possibility of military strife between the states.' 99
Although Madison, like Hamilton, recognized the military ambitions of other nations, he seemed to share the anti-federalist commitment to a more pacific course for the United States. Agreeing
that liberty is destroyed by "military establishments," he
concluded:
A standing force therefore, is a dangerous, at the same
time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale
its consequences may be fatal. On any scale, it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise
nation will combine all these considerations; and whilst
it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource
which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its
No. 4, at 22 U. Jay) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
No. 29, at 182 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
FEDERALIST No. 25, at 162 (A. Hamilton) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
FEDERALIST No. 34, at 211 (A. Hamilton) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
FEDERALIST No. 41, at 271 (J. Madison) (. Cooke ed. 1961).

195. See THE
196. See THE
197. See THE

198.
199.

THE
THE

FEDERALIST

FEDERALIST
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prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its
20 0
liberties.
Madison's conclusion attests to the fact that the ideological
consensus about the dangers of a standing army was still widely
shared in the 1780s. But Hamilton's words reveal a glimpse of
the breakdown of that concensus. This breakdown led the antifederalists to seek protection against the growth of a national
standing army, making it a central part of their demand for a bill
of rights.
H.

The Standing Army Controversy and the Bill of Rights

The most enduring product of the anti-federalist critique of
the proposed constitution was the eventual adoption of the Bill of
Rights. Prominent among the original proposals made for such a
bill were clauses intended to set limits on the national power to
raise and maintain a standing army. The first examples of such
clauses were found in the report written by the minority, or anti20 1
federalist, delegates to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention.
Although the convention majority rejected these proposals, the
minority report was printed in pamphlet and newspaper form and
had a strong influence on later participants in the ratification debates. The report lucidly articulated the various anti-federalist
objections to standing armies and to federal control of the militia. 20 2 It also proposed two amendments that spoke directly to
200. Id.
201. For a readable general history of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, see Graham, Pennsylvania Representation and the Meaning of Republicanism, in
RATIFYING THE CONS'rrITmON, supra note 162, at 52.
202. See Pennsylvania Address, supra note 183, at 163-65. The Pennsylvania
Minority's Address covers the entire range of anti-federalist objections to the
military provisions of the proposed Constitution. Claiming that the framers
must have "been sensible that no dependence could be placed on the people for
their support: but on the contrary, that the government must be executed by
force," the report castigates the provisions for "a permanent STANDING
ARMY" and for "strict discipline and government" of the militia. It identifies
many reasons why these provisions are dangerous: first, that a standing army
may "overturn the public liberties" and permit "[a]n ambitious man" to seize
"absolute power;" second, that "personal liberty" of individual militia members
may be destroyed as they are subjected to fines, corporal punishment, and even
the death sentence under martial law; third, that there is no protection for conscientious objectors; fourth, that the militia of one state may be marched to
other states "to quell an insurrection occasioned by the most galling oppression
...
[and thus] be made the instruments of crushing the last efforts of expiring
liberty;" and finally, that a government executed by force and a host of troops
and officers will be "a very expensive and burthensome" one. Id.
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these concerns.
The first of these amendments, in language tracking that of
the Pennsylvania state constitution, recognized the right of the
people to bear arms and provided that "standing armies in the
time of peace ... ought not to be kept up." 20 3 The second insured that control over the militia would remain with the individ20 4
ual states.

Similarly proposals for amendments to the Constitution were
made by a minority group at the Maryland convention and by the
majority delegates of New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island and Virginia. 20 5 Generally, these amendments contained language disapproving of standing armies and requiring
203. Id. at 151. The full text of this amendment stated the following:
7. That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose
of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or
any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up: and that the military
shall be kept under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil
powers.
Id.
204. Id. at 152. The text of this amendment stated the following:
11. That the power of organizing, arming and disciplining the militia
(the manner of disciplining the militia to be prescribed by Congress)
remain with the individual states, and that Congress shall not have authority to call or march any of the militia out of their own state, without
the consent of such state, and for such length of time only as such state
shall agree.
Id.
205. The Maryland minority proposed amendments protecting against
standing armies in peacetime by requiring a two-thirds vote of Congress to raise
them, limiting federal control of the militia, and protecting individual rights of
conscientious objectors and soldiers. Maryland Ratifying Convention, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 734-35 (B. Schwartz ed. 1980)
[hereinafter 4 ROOTS]. New Hampshire proposed amendments requiring a
three-fourths vote of Congress to keep up a standing army in time of peace, and
preventing quartering of soldiers in private homes without the owner's consent.
New Hampshire Proposed Amendments, 1788, reprinted in 4 ROOTS, supra, at
761. Virginia proposed amendments recognizing the fight to bear arms and the
importance of the militia, and requiring a two-thirds vote of Congress to raise
standing armies in peacetime, prohibiting the quartering of soldiers, and limiting enlistments to four years. Virginia Ratifying Convention, 1788, reprinted in 4
ROOTS, supra, at 842-43. New York adopted a declaration of rights which recognized the importance of the militia and the dangers of standing armies in peacetime and recommended amendments requiring a two-thirds vote to raise
standing armies in peacetime, a two-thirds vote to declare war, and a six-week
limit on how long the militia could be required to serve out of state. New York
Proposed Amendments, 1788, reprintedin 4 ROOTS, supra, at 915-16, 918. North
Carolina recommended both a declaration of rights and a set of amendments
containing the same relevant language as that of Virginia. North Carolina Convention Debates, reprinted in 4 ROOTS, supra, at 968-69.
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two-thirds or three-quarters votes by Congress before they could
be raised. When such an amendment was proposed in the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison spoke in opposition to the requirement for a two-thirds vote:
I most devoutly wish that there may never be an occasion
for having a single regiment. There can be no harm in
declaring that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and ought to be avoided . . . . But
when we come to say that the national security shall depend, not on a majority of the people of America, but
that it may be frustrated by less than one third of the
people of America, I ask if this be a safe or proper mode
206

Despite Madison's opposition, this proposal was endorsed by the
20 7
convention.
Since it was Madison who sifted through all of the proposed
amendments. recommended by the state conventions in order to
produce a set of proposed amendments to introduce to the first
Congress onJune 8, 1789, it is perhaps not surprising that this set
did not include the provision requiring a super-majority vote to
raise standing armies in peacetime,2 0 8 even though five states had
suggested it.209 More striking is that the list of proposed amend206. Virginia Ratifying Convention, 1788, supra note 205, at 825.
207. Thomas Jefferson was also in favor of including protections against
standing armies in a bill of rights. He wrote a letter to David Humphreys in
1789, endorsing the addition of such a bill to the Constitution:
There are instruments so dangerous to the rights of the nation, and
which place them so totally at the mercy of their governors, that those
governors, whether legislative or executive, should be restrained from
keeping such instruments on foot but in well-defined cases. Such an
instrument is a standing army.
Letter from Jefferson to Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE ROOTS OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1000 (B. Schwartz ed. 1980) [hereinafter 5 ROOTS]; see alo
LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORICAL RECORD OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 68 (J. Smith & P. Murphy eds. 1958) (letter from Jefferson to

Madison, December 20, 1787).
208. See House of Representatives Debates (May-June, 1789), reprinted in 5
ROOTS, supra note 207, at 1026-28.
209. It should be noted that the number of state conventions suggesting an
amendment requiring a super-majority vote to raise armies was greater than: 1)
the number seeking amendments guaranteeing the rights to assemble, to due
process or against cruel and unusual punishment (four); 2) the number seeking
guarantees of freedom of speech or rights of criminal procedure (three); and 3)
the number seeking to bar double jeopardy (two). See 5 ROOTS, supra note 207,
at 1167 (table showing which Bill of Rights guarantees contained in state
amendments); Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 222 (1983).
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ments did not include any explicit reference at all to the concern
about standing armies. Two of the suggested amendments, however, did arise from the standing army controversy: 1) "The right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well
armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free
country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms
shall be compelled to render military service in person" and
2) protection against the quartering of soldiers in private homes
2 10
in time of peace.
21
When the first, or ','well regulated militia" amendment, '
came up for discussion in the House of Representatives, a motion
was made to add language disapproving of standing armies in
time of peace and requiring a two-thirds majority of Congress to
raise them. But the motion was defeated. 21 2 Later, when the
same amendment was under consideration in the Senate, a motion was made yet again to incorporate language disapproving of,
and placing a limitation on, the raising of standing armies in
peacetime. This motion was also defeated by a narrow vote of
213
nine to six.
Thus, despite repeated efforts to include clauses in the Bill of
Rights explicitly reflecting the widespread opposition to standing
armies, such efforts failed. The imprint of that opposition was
left, however, certainly but much more obscurely, in the second
2 14
and third amendments.
210. See House of Representatives Debates (May-June, 1789), supra note
208, at 1026-27.
211. Before being presented to Congress, this proposed amendment was
altered in committee to read: "A well regulated militia, composed of the body of
the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall
be compelled to bear arms." House of Representatives Debates (July-Aug.,
1789), reprinted in 5 ROOTS, supra note 207, at 1107.
212. Id. at 1109-10.
213. See Senate Journal (Aug.-Sept., 1789), reprinted in 5 ROOTS, supra note
207, at 1149. Before the final version of the Bill of Rights left the Senate to be
ratified by the states, there was one last attempt to add this anti-standing army
language and limitation. Once again it did not succeed. Id. at 1152.
214. Recently, there has been renewed interest in these "neglected"
amendments and their meaning, especially the second amendment. See, e.g.,
Levinson, supra note 86, at 640-42. For differing perspectives on the historiography of the second amendment, see generally Cress, An Armed Community: The
Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Hardy,
supra note 83. Although there is considerable debate about the exact nature of
these amendments, both historically and as they might be applied today, there is
a general consensus that the fear of standing armies lay behind them. One author has noted:
Although there is undoubtedly room for argument based on the frequently conflicting sources of history, it is not unreasonable to believe
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If the Constitution had included language expressly disapproving of standing peacetime armies, or a clause requiring that
Congress vote by a two-thirds or three-quarters majority to raise
one, we would have had a different constitutional jurisprudence
and perhaps even different a national history. Yet although the
concerns raised during the anti-standing army debate were incorporated obliquely rather than explicitly into the constitutional
text, they still reflected a widespread and powerful point of view,
one apparently shared by Madison and other federalists, as well as
by the anti-federalists. This viewpoint, all too often entirely forgotten by contemporary interpreters, has the power to illuminate
our contemporary ways of thinking about the relationship between military institutions and civil liberties. It reminds us that
military institutions by their nature are inhospitable to civil liberties, and that in order to maximize liberty in society, the role of
miltiary institutions must be kept to a minimum and closely confined. As the next section will develop, the insights gleaned from
this eighteenth century debate suggest that we would profit by
rethinking the nature of the dilemma that confronted the
Supreme Court in the Stanley cases.
IV.

RETHINKING THE DEFERENCE THAT

Is

DUE

Viewing the Stanley cases through the lens of late eighteenth
century history makes the anti-federalists seem eerily prescient.
Although the federalists ridiculed anti-federalist fears that the
proposed Constitution would permit the growth of a large
standing peacetime army, such a military establishment has in fact
developed. As the anti-federalists warned, this military establishment seriously drains the national economy and increases the
power of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative
2 15
branch.
More directly to the point for the purposes of this Article, the
existence of this large permanent military establishment brings
many citizens under the regime of military rules and regulations.
This expansive military influence is evident not only during periods of declared war and periods of fighting short of a fully-declared war, but during peacetime as well. These rules and
that our Founders' determination to guarantee the preeminence of civil
over military power was an important element that prompted adoption
of the Constitutional Amendments we call the Bill of Rights.
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Militaiy, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 185 (1962).
215. For a discussion of the anti-federalists' fears of a standing army, see
supra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990

47

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 6 [1990], Art. 1

1056

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: p. 1009

regulations allow considerably less room for the exercise of individual civil rights and liberties than those governing civilian life.
As the majority in the Stanley cases continually emphasized, and as
the dissenters were forced to acknowledge, life in a military setting is naturally less free than civilian life.
This incompatibility between military institutions and individual liberty repeatedly confronted the Supreme Court in the
Stanley cases. The majority's response, as described above, was
consistently to favor military institutions by assenting to whatever
curtailment of liberty the military believed to be required. The
dissent, on the other hand, hoped to somehow sidestep the conflict by adjusting military institutions to fit the Bill of Rights. But
neither approach takes seriously enough the troubling reality of
the dilemma itself.
The intractable nature of the conflict between the norms of
military institutions and the values of civilian life was exactly what
worried the participants in the eighteenth century "standing
army" debate.2 16 To them, the problem was plain. Since professional military institutions by their very nature were inconsistent
with civil liberties, it was dangerous to permit such institutions to
grow. The answer, then, had to be structural. Only by carefully
confining the existence of these institutions during peacetime
could society hope to remain fully free.
Finding an appropriate level of deference for judicial review
of claims against the military requires consideration of this
broader, structural, perspective. What is the appropriate place
for military institutions in a peacetime society? There can be no
truly thoughtful resolution of the dilemma posed by the Stanley
cases without considering this question.
A.

The Militaiy as a "Separate Community"

While members of the founding generation disagreed on
many issues about the military, they did agree that professional
military institutions significantly differed from the institutions of
civilian society. These differences were a major source of their
distrust of military institutions. They were also among their reasons for preferring a citizen militia to a professional army.
The founding generation was well aware that the military establishment, and the military camp, operated by different rules
216. For example, recall Samuel Adams's comment that "the maxims and
rules of the army are essentially different from the genius of a free people, and
the laws of a free government." See S. ADAMS, supra note 95, at 264-65.
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and under different principles than those of the civilian society
they cherished. Although attempts were made, even under the
pressure of fighting the Revolutionary War, to devise more relaxed and more "American" approaches to military discipline
than the harsh European ones, 217 it was generally understood
that conditions in the military could never incorporate the liberty
and self-governance of civilian life. In turn, the nature of daily
military life would shape a certain type of men with a certain type
of interests, not necessarily congruent with those of civilians. To
rely on a militia was preferable since men would retain their connections to civilian life and continue to practice the habits of free
citizens.
In this respect, the majority position in the Stanley cases
seems to be on target about something which, however unpleasant, has long been recognized to be correct. As Justice Rehnquist
writes, "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate
from civilian society," 218 and discipline, hierarchy, uniformity,
and obedience are its hallmarks. Free speech, due process, and
equal treatment are not the norms of basic training.
This is not to say that there need be total disregard for society's general commitment to free speech, free association, freedom of religion, and equal protection in order to maintain
necessary military discipline and preparedness. Attempts can and
should be made to incorporate those values as much as possible
into the daily routines of military life. But it must be recognized
that other aspects of the military mission are necessarily in conflict with those values, and this will especially be true in a time of
genuine military crisis or attack. Judicial deference to the judgment of military officials about where to draw these lines is not
surprising, because no judge wants to risk being the one who
promulgated a rule which disabled the military forces from maintaining and mounting an effective defense.
Indeed, even the dissenters in the Stanley cases agree that
under many circumstances the scope of freedom afforded members of the military under the Bill of Rights must be narrower
than that accorded to civilians. Justice Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor all state this explicitly, 219 and even Justice
217. See C. ROYSTER, supra note 98, at 78, 217-38 (describing less rigid
American approaches to military discipline).
218. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). For a discussion of the majority opinion in Parker, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
219. For the Justices' statements indicating their recognition that curtailed
rights for those in the military may be appropriate, see supra notes 27 (Black-
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Douglas recognized that "[tihe power to draft an army includes,
of course, the power to curtail considerably the 'liberty' of the
people who make it up." 220 The idea that freedom in the military
must inevitably be more restricted than freedom in civilian life
seems central to our most basic understanding of the nature of
military institutions. Thus, although attempts to incorporate
more libertarian values into the conduct of military life should be
applauded, one must recognize that this process can only go so
far.
As a result, the proper structural balance between military
institutions and civilian society becomes critical. The problem is
not that military institutions, by their nature "different from the
genius of a free people," 22 1 are unfree. When properly confined
and limited-in Madison's words, when they remain "an object of
laudable circumspection and precaution" 22 2 -military forces may
be a necessary, if unhappy, element of national life in times of

crisis. Under such crisis, liberty inevitably suffers; though this
may be cause for regret, it need not be fatal if a corrective return
to the values of civilian life follows quickly once the crisis is past.
The problem arises when military institutions grow and become a permanent and dominant feature of national peacetime
life. The "standing army in time of peace" feared by eighteenth
century Americans finds its contemporary analogue in the "national security state" created after World War II. Those in the
anti-standing army tradition believed that a society pervaded by
the needs of military institutions would inevitably begin to lose
both the individual liberties of citizens directly subject to those
institutions and broader social liberty as well.
The deference of the majority in the Stanley cases to the
claimed needs of military discipline and effectiveness might be appropriate if they were confronting challenges to a temporary army
in the field like the Continental Army, which even those in the
eighteenth century reluctantly understood might be necessary to
meet a passing crisis of national defense. But the Court failed to
take notice that it was dealing with an entirely different kind of
animal. The military being challenged in the Stanley cases is not
one mustered in an emergency to meet urgent defense needs durmun), 52 (Marshall), 60-61 (O'Connor), 64 (Brennan and O'Connor) and accompanying text.
220. Parker, 417 U.S. at 772 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
221. See S. ADAMS, supra note 95, at 264-65.
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 271 (J. Madison) (I. Cooke ed. 1961).
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ing a congressionally declared war. Instead, the institution being
challenged is one which has become permanent, enormous, and
entrenched: an interlocking set of military establishments that
reach pervasively into every corner of national life. It is inappropriate to judge this "standing army" and a temporary army with
the same yardstick of military necessity. In the face of this existing military institution, the unthinking deference of the majority is misplaced.
B. Containing the "Separate Community"
Judicial deference to the military in the face of constitutional
claims for greater liberty, equity, and due process is just one facet
of contemporary judicial accommodation to the need for national
security. The political question doctrine, 223 doctrines of tort immunity such as the Feres doctrine2 24 and the government contractor defense, 225 judicial refusal to allow state governors to
question National Guard deployment,2 26 and a potpourri ofjudicial decisions in the field of foreign affairs 22 7 are all evidence of a
widespread judicial reluctance to scrutinize policies and practices
declared to be necessary for national defense. Nor is the judiciary
by any means alone in this process of accommodation. Despite
228
certain legislative counterthrusts in the opposite direction,
223. See generally Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J.
597 (1976); Tigar,Judicial Power, the "PoliticalQuestion Doctrine,"and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1135 (1970). For recent cases invoking the doctrine in
the national security area, see Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (legality of military action in Nicaragua nonjusticiable political question); Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (constitutionality
of deployment of cruise missiles nonjusticiable political question); Crockett v.
Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984) (whether government actions in
El Salvador violate War Powers Resolution nonjusticiable political question).
224. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (government not liable
under Federal Tort Claims Act for military personnel's injuries arising out of or
incident to service).
225. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (federal
government contractors may be immunized from liability under state tort law for
design defects in military equipment).
226. Perpich v. Department of Defense, 58 U.S.L.W. 4750 (U.S. June 11,
1990).
227. For a discussion of these cases, see Koh, supra note 74, at 1305-17.
228. For example, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in the aftermath of the Vietnam War in order to strengthen its role in decision-making
concerning deployment of American military forces. See Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87
Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988)). The
impact of the Resolution on actual practice to date in the cases of Grenada, the
Persian Gulf, Libya, and Panama has been minimal, at best. In 1982, Congress
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without the complicity of both the legislative and the executive

branches, military institutions and military needs could never
have come to define the national political agenda to such an extensive degree.

Reversing this course of events---containing the "separate
community"-will be a complex and difficult undertaking involv-

ing a wide spectrum of steps. 229 The dramatic changes created by
the ending of the Cold War era and the shift of attention to the
Persian Gulf require that we re-define the meaning of national
security and rethink our military priorities. If this country moves
in the direction of a prolonged military presence in a new and
faraway part of the world, with an extensive military machine involving thousands of women and men, it is quite likely that the

judiciary will again have to confront questions of the clash between military practices and constitutional norms. Individual
soldiers far from home in an environment with very different
norms and customs may find their freedom of action sharply limited. If they choose to challenge military restrictions on their
freedom, the courts will again find themselves on the horns of a

dilemma where saying "yes" to the military imperils valued civil
liberties, but saying "yes" to civil liberties seems to conflict with
23 0
the requirements of the military mission.
passed the Boland Amendment to prevent military intervention in Nicaragua.
See Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793,
96 Stat. 1865 (1982). Despite the covert efforts to circumvent this Amendment
which have been revealed by the Iran-Contra hearings and trials, it appears that
in this instance Congress was somewhat more successful in achieving its goal.
229. Scholars have recognized that in the face of the enormous expansion
of the armed forces, constitutional and legal controls over the military no longer
seem to be working. See, e.g. Yarmolinsky, Civilian Control New Perspectives for
New Problems, 49 IND, L.J. 654, 655 (1974) ("The fact is that the apparatus of
civilian control that was developed to implement the original concept of the
founding fathers has proved wholly inadequate to control an establishment several orders of magnitude larger and more complex.") As a result, several writers
have recently begun suggesting ways to develop stronger legal mechanisms to
contain the pervasiveness of American military institutions. See Goldstein, The
Failureof ConstitutionalControls over War Powers in the Nuclear Age: The Argument for a
Constitutional Amendment, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1543, 1587 (1988) (recommending
constitutional amendment requiring Congress to "supervise and oversee military planning, capabilities, and readiness" and creating private right of action
permitting citizens to enforce in court congressional failure "to provide adequate oversight"); Koh, supra note 74, at 1320-38 (suggesting legislative, administrative, and judicial changes to increase constraint over executive power in area
of national security); Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: FeministJurisprudence as Oxymoron? 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989) (urging feminist, direct action approaches to transform intersection of law and militarism).
230. The outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf since the completion of this
Article has shifted the American military for some undetermined time from a
peacetime to a wartime status. In wartime, concerns about the civil liberties of
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The founding generation faced this same dilemma. Because
many of them believed that extensive standing armies were inherently incompatible with full liberty, they sought to avoid any possibility that the new Constitution might permit their unfettered
growth. They thought that to maintain the proper balance between civil liberties and military necessity, the very existence of
professional military institutions in peacetime should be severely
confined. In Madison's words, the nation should "exert all its
prudence" to diminish the possibility that resort to such a "dan231
gerous" expedient would be necessary.
Judicial understanding of and attention to, this historical tradition would permit a more perceptive contemporary analysis of
individual constitutional claims against the military. Recognizing
that these cases arise in the context of an expansion of peacetime
military institutions totally unanticipated by the Constitution will
encourage judges not only to address the proper scope of civil
liberties within the military, but also to question the proper scope
of the institutions themselves. Without such questioning, uncritical judicial deference to the excessive aggrandizement of military
institutions will threaten the liberties of individuals and of society
alike.
our military forces may temporarily be overshadowed by more immediate concerns for their lives and safety. With the end of the war, however, a vast military
establishment will remain. To prepare for that time, national debate must be
focused on the concern raised by this Article about the incompatibility between
such an extensive military and civil libertarian values.
231. See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 271 (U.Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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